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Abstract
The international maritime container trade, which imports an average of 19,000
largely uninspected cargo containers to United States ports each day, has been identified
as a potential avenue of attack for nuclear terrorism. Currently envisioned and deployed
defensive measures that seek to detect and interdict concealed fissile material once
containers have already reached a U.S. port do not adequately protect against nuclear
threats due to the unique power and range of nuclear weapon effects. This thesis
describes and examines a novel "ship-based" approach to container-borne fissile material
detection where suites of radiation detectors with imaging capabilities are enclosed in
standard, non-descript cargo containers and shipped in limited numbers aboard
commercial containerships. Outfitted with communication hardware, these dedicated
containerized units could provide crucial advance detection and notification of an
inbound nuclear threat while the danger is still safely removed from U.S. shores.
Attributes of the container shipping trade that would impact the performance and
viability of the proposed ship-based approach were identified and investigated. Average
available count times, based on the duration of shipping voyages, for container imports to
representative ports on the east and west coasts of the U.S. where found to be 19.2 days
and 13.3. days, respectively. These long count times will enhance the ability of the ship-
based approach to confidently detect heavily shielded and well-concealed fissile material.
A distribution for the average distributed density of commercial cargo, which affects
radiation attenuation between the source and detectors, was also derived and found to
have a favorably low mean value of 0.198 g/cm3 .
The coverage efficiency (i.e. the number of containerized units required to
provide detection coverage over a given percentage of a reference vessel) variations
associated with prospective modes of deployment were also investigated using Matlab-
based computer simulations. Evaluated deployment strategies ranged from fully random
placement of detection units to completely constrained optimal placement. Despite
holding important advantages in terms of stealth, random deployment was found to
require an average of between 2.2 to 3.3 times more detectors than optimal deployment,
depending on the desired level of detection coverage. This result suggests that some
combination of random and constrained deployment might yield an optimized balance
between stealth and coverage efficiency. This analysis also identified significant
efficiency and deployment flexibility benefits associated with units that could detect
sources at ranges equal to, or greater than, 70 ft (21.3 m).
Overall, no results were obtained that seriously challenged the potential efficacy
and viability of the proposed ship-based approach.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard C. Lanza
Title: Senior Research Scientist in Nuclear Engineering
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Chapter 1: Nuclear Terrorism Threat
1.1 Objectives and Organization of Thesis
The objective of this thesis is to describe and analyze a novel "ship-based" approach,
proposed by Gallagher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), for the
detection of fissile material concealed in waterborne cargo containers. The need for new
thinking will be established by investigating the nature of the threat posed by
unconventional nuclear attack and nuclear terrorism and then highlighting the critical
shortcomings of currently deployed approaches that seek to address this threat. The
attributes and advantages of the ship-based approach will then be examined in the context
of the threat and compared to existing detection and interdiction methodologies. Once a
case for the promise and utility of the proposed approach has been presented, analysis
will be performed to remove or constrain important remaining uncertainties related the to
potential efficacy and viability of a ship-based fissile material detection regime.
1.2 Introduction
The specter of nuclear weapons has loomed large over the Earth since their
dramatic introduction to the world in 1945. The nature of the threat that these weapons
pose to the United States, however, has evolved over time. The end of the Cold War
brought with it a relaxation of the conventional nuclear threat stemming from blast
hardened silos dotting the land, strategic bombers roaming the skies, and ballistic missile
submarines prowling the seas. Yet, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
ascendance of transnational terrorism has brought with it a new challenge for the nuclear
age, that of devising and implementing effective strategies to prevent the acquisition and
deployment of nuclear weapons by individuals and organizations who are not restrained
by the same means that had deterred nuclear catastrophes for more than half a century.
Although the dynamics of the threat have changed, what remains constant is the
understanding that the detonation of a single nuclear device on American soil would have
11
profound and lasting impacts on this country and the world, the scale and breadth of
which are difficult to comprehend.
1.3 Threat Dynamics
The September 1 1 th attacks clearly demonstrated that transnational terrorist
organizations have supplanted state-based actors as the primary (or at least most
immediate) threat to the security of the United States. To strengthen our homeland
security posture and develop more effective strategies to defend against attack, including
those involving unconventional weapons, we must seek to understand how the emergence
of this new adversary alters the nature of threats faced by the United States. The
transnational terrorist organizations we must combat today are not only fundamentally
different than the state-based adversary faced during the Cold War, they are also
markedly different from terrorist organizations that have been encountered in decades
past. Some critical differences, at least as they pertain to the threat of nuclear attack, can
be generally described in terms of deterability, material access, and motivation.
Nuclear aggression during the Cold War was deterred through the doctrine of
mutually assured destruction. This conventional means of deterrence was effective
because the primary belligerents were state-based actors having well-defined borders
with citizens and national assets to protect. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
developed nuclear arsenals massive enough, and deployment platforms and delivery
systems diverse enough, that any offensive nuclear strike was sure to be met with a
devastating retaliatory counterattack [Knorr, 1985]. Therefore, the motivation to unleash
nuclear weapons to destroy the enemy was checked by the understanding that a decisive
blow could not be struck without the assurance of a crippling reprisal. However, unlike
states, transnational terrorist organizations, in general, are highly mobile, have no
delineated territorial borders, and no populace to defend. Without fixed targets to be held
in jeopardy of counter-attack, a terrorist organization can hope to deliver a devastating
blow without the prospect (or at least the assurance) of immediate annihilation.
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Therefore, a transnational terrorist adversary contemplating a nuclear attack remains
undeterred by conventional means.
Unlike a large state-based actor, a terrorist organization is unlikely to have open
access to a military-industrial infrastructure dedicated to the production of fissile material
and the design and assembly of nuclear weapons. Numerous barriers, both physical and
political, have been erected by international institutions to inhibit the flow of fissile
material from established nuclear states, which are susceptible to conventional means of
deterrence, to undeterred terrorist organizations [Bunn et. al, 2003]. As such, even highly
motivated, well financed terrorist groups will likely find gaining access to fissile material
the most difficult and daunting aspect of initiating a nuclear attack. The difficulty
associated with the procurement or acquisition of fissile material, and the resulting
scarcity of the commodity, has important implications for how an attack might be
planned and executed.
In the past, terrorist organizations used attacks primarily in an attempt to achieve
political objectives [NCT, 2000]. With this political motivation, it was thought that
terrorist organizations would eschew attacks that claimed large numbers of civilian lives,
because such an act would promote public outcry, inspire widespread condemnation of
the perpetrators and ultimately weaken support for their cause [Hoffman, 1995]. The
transnational terrorist organizations threatening the United States today, however, are
increasingly found to have at their core fanatical religious and ideological, rather than
purely political, motivations [Laqueur, 1998]. With radical religious ideology serving as
the basis, attacks are no longer carried out with the express purpose of meeting political
ends. Instead, they are executed to destroy infidels and punish the enemies of God/Allah.
As such, religiously inspired terrorist organizations now tend to view attacks that cause
mass casualties as desirable rather than taboo [Morgan, 2004]. This motivational shift
was summed up succinctly by former CIA director James Woolsey who said, "Today's
terrorists don't want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting
at it." [NCT, 2000]
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Another key to understanding the threat posed by unconventional nuclear attack is
to appreciate the unique destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. Although they are
often grouped alongside chemical and biological weapons under the generic banner of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear weapons stand markedly apart even from
their other WMD brethren. The totality of destruction that can be wrought, together with
the massive spatial and instantaneous temporal scales over which their effects are
unleashed, combine to make the gravity of threats posed by nuclear weapons wholly
unique. Unlike chemical and biological agents that inflict harm by specifically targeting
and damaging human biological functions, nuclear weapons destroy in a much more
indiscriminate manner. With their combined thermal, blast, and radiation effects, nuclear
weapons inflict their damage on all forms of matter in their vicinity, including people,
buildings, and economically vital infrastructure. These effects can be devastating even at
distances far removed from the location of the actual detonation. Finally, the primary
effects of a nuclear detonation are all experienced more or less instantaneously and
simultaneously, and without warning. As such, there is no time for affected populations
to evacuate or seek refuge once a nuclear weapon has been actuated.
Given the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the motivation and stated
desire of transnational terrorist organizations to obtain and use these weapons, and the
ineffectiveness of conventional means to deter terrorist-mounted nuclear attacks, it is
unacceptable to rely solely on existing barriers meant to prevent unauthorized parties
from gaining access to fissile material or assembled weapons. Realizing that no
individual barrier or safeguard is going to provide perfectly reliable protection, we must
develop multiple, redundant and diverse layers of protection that can impede or disrupt
all phases of attack from fissile material procurement to final operational deployment.
One important step in effectively implementing this type of defense-in-depth protection
philosophy is to identify and assess potential avenues of attack that could be used by a
terrorist adversary that had somehow managed to obtain fissile material. The
vulnerabilities of each potential avenue of attack should then be evaluated so that
deficiencies can be identified and remediated.
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1.4 Container Scenario Development
One potentially vulnerable avenue of attack flows through US seaports where an
average ofjust over 19,000 cargo containers arrive by ship each day [MARAD(1), 2004],
any one of which could be used by an adversary to conceal fissile material or an
assembled nuclear device. Only about 4% of these incoming cargo containers currently
undergo any type of physical inspection [Lok, 2004]. The vulnerability associated with
thousands of opaque, largely uninspected, and loosely controlled cargo containers
arriving on U.S. shores everyday is compounded by the proximity of major seaports to
large metropolitan population centers. As a result of this collocation, a weapon arriving
in a major U.S. port is often already in range to cause massive casualties, regardless of
the intended ultimate target of the device. Despite security concerns, seaports and the
international container shipping trade are critical to sustaining modern global commerce
and to maintaining a healthy U.S. economy. The transaction of international commerce
requires an open architecture, where containerized goods can move freely and efficiently
between countries and across borders. Therefore a critical and urgent challenge remains
to develop and implement protective measures that can enhance the U.S. security posture
with respect to seaports and incoming containers of foreign origin, without unduly
burdening the free flow of commerce.
As a first step in meeting the challenge of successfully addressing port and cargo
container related vulnerabilities, a conservative threat scenario will be developed based
on carefully chosen and logically defended assumptions. Scenario development will
frame the problem, allowing helpful insights to be drawn. The resulting product will then
provide a means to evaluate the efficacy and highlight weaknesses of potential solutions.
The overarching assumption used in scenario development is that a rational,
determined adversary would always seek to maximize the probability of a successful
attack. (Despite fanatical religious ideologies, transnational terrorist organizations have
repeatedly proven themselves rational in the context of operational planning,
coordination and execution.) As discussed later, in detail, the following propositions are
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some logical implications of the "rational enemy assumption" as applied to a
transnational terrorist adversary: 1) if an enemy somehow procures fissile material, they
will seek to weaponize it (if not already in the form of a functional nuclear weapon) and
use it; 2) an enemy will seek to weaponize unassembled fissile material prior to container
shipment to the U.S.; and 3) an enemy may provide some means (e.g. booby-trapping or
remote detonation capability) to thwart the successful interdiction and neutralization of a
deployed (i.e. shipped) weapon.
The assertion that a transnational terrorist organization, having obtained fissile
material, will weaponize it and attempt to use it is perhaps the most easily justified of the
preceding discussion. A number of leading figures in transnational terrorist organizations
(including al Qaeda) have openly professed their desire to obtain nuclear weapons and
there have been several well-documented attempts to purchase fissile material [Lee,
2003]. Additionally, these groups have demonstrated the motivation and ability to carry
out well planned, large-scale attacks that result in mass civilian casualties. Finally, as
noted previously, highly mobile, borderless terrorist organizations are not stymied by
conventional means of deterrence based on the threat of massive retaliation. Given the
vigor with which fissile material procurement has been pursued, the repeatedly
demonstrated willingness to employ ever more lethal tactics to carry out high-casualty
attacks, and the undeterred nature of the adversary, it is reasonable, and certainly
conservative, to posit that if a sufficient quantity of fissile material is obtained, a terrorist
organization would seek to assemble it into a weapon and use it for an attack.
The belief that an enemy would seek to ship a functional weapon to the U.S., as
opposed to unassembled fissile material, follows from the rational enemy assumption for
the following two reasons. First, to maximize the probability of a successful attack, an
adversary that had obtained unassembled fissile material would clearly want to avoid
disruption or detection during the device assembly process. Unfettered weapon assembly
and preparation would presumably be far easier to achieve abroad, in a location of the
terrorists' choosing, where they could enjoy a substantially stronger and more secure
support network, in addition to a less menacing intelligence gathering and law
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enforcement presence than would be encountered in the United States. Second, a rational
adversary would seek to ship a functioning weapon rather than attempt to smuggle
unassembled fissile material into the U.S. to create the possibility that some degree of
operational success (i.e. a nuclear detonation causing significant casualties and physical
damage) could still be achieved even in the event that the device was somehow detected
or discovered prior to reaching its intended target. There is no such possibility of limited
success if the fissile material has not been weaponized prior to shipment.
The assertion that an adversary would seek to implement countermeasures such as
"booby traps" or remote detonation provisions to guard against interdiction and
disarmament prior to detonation can also be defended using the rational enemy
assumption. "Booby-traps" are defined here as a feature or features intended to trigger
detonation of the device if certain perturbations, such as mechanical or radiation probing,
are experienced. A remote detonation capability would give an adversary the opportunity
to detonate a detected weapon before it could be isolated and rendered safe. Despite the
technological difficulty of implementing such features, the presence of countermeasures
to guard against interdiction cannot be ruled out since the rational-enemy assumption
dictates that an adversary would aggressively seek to ensure detonation once the weapon
was deployed. The desire to ensure detonation, using any available means, would only
be amplified by the extremely limited availability of fissile material and the extraordinary
efforts that were likely required to obtain it. Even if the device did not reach its intended
target, a nuclear explosion impacting any Western port or territory would presumably be
a marginally successful outcome for a terrorist organization.
Finally, to accept the rational enemy assumption but to reject the possibility of
countermeasures being present requires the assumption that an enemy is not capable, for
whatever reason, of implementing them. However, the fact that we concern ourselves
with screening cargo containers for fissile material in the first place implies that we are
willing to accept that an enemy possesses a level of sophistication high enough to
procure, transport, (possibly) assemble and deploy a nuclear weapon, all without being
detected or exposed by any military, law enforcement or intelligence gathering
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organization. It seems, therefore, wholly irrational to then assume that the same enemy is
not sophisticated enough to devise and implement effective countermeasures.
Consistent with the assumptions discussed in the previous paragraphs, we now
postulate a scenario in which a functional nuclear weapon is concealed in a standard, full
sized (40' long, 8' wide and 8.5' high) cargo container and deployed from a foreign
location aboard a transoceanic container vessel that is due to call on a major United
States seaport that is in or adjacent to a large urban population center (e.g. New York
City or Los Angeles). We conservatively assume that the weapon is surrounded with
some level of shielding appropriate for the fissile material used in the weapon (i.e. high
atomic number material for uranium or both low and high atomic number material for
plutonium). We further assume that the device has been outfitted with counter-
interdiction features, including a remote detonation capability and booby-traps that
trigger the weapon in the event that certain mechanical or radiation insults are
experienced.
We consider the above scenario (referred to hereafter as "the container scenario")
to be conservative and bounding. As such, it is assumed that an approach that can defeat
this extremely challenging scenario can similarly defeat any number of less conservative,
less challenging scenarios. We further believe that the highly conservative nature of the
container scenario is appropriate considering the extraordinarily dire consequences of a
successful nuclear attack on U.S. soil and the fact that none of the (admittedly)
improbable elements of the scenario can be confidently excluded as incredible.
Using the postulated container scenario we can now make a number of useful
observations regarding the capabilities that will be required to successfully address the
specific vulnerabilities associated with the commercial maritime container trade as an
avenue for nuclear attack. First, it is clear that the only way to ensure adequate protection
from this threat is to keep the weapon (or the container concealing the weapon) from ever
reaching U.S. shores. To do this, not only must the weapon be detected prior to the
threat-bearing vessel reaching a U.S. port of call, but the presence of this threat must also
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be communicated to appropriate parties in time for an effective response to be mobilized
prior to port entry. Additionally, the initial threat detection must be made in a manner
that accounts for the possibility that countermeasures may be present, which could
function the weapon if intrusive perturbations are experienced.
The ultimate success criterion for any defensive measure (or measures) in
defeating the container scenario or any other postulated nuclear attack is not the detection
of the device; it is the ability to prevent a nuclear detonation that physically impacts the
United States. Detecting the weapon is a necessary but not sufficient step toward
defeating this threat. Stated differently, the deployment of a defensive measure that
detects incoming fissile material with perfect effectiveness and reliability (even if this
were possible) fails to adequately protect against the threat of nuclear attack if the
weapon isn't detected until it is already in range to impact the United States (e.g. in a
U.S. port).
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Chapter 2: Fissile Material Detection
2.1 Fissile Material Characteristics
It is clear both intuitively and from the earlier discussion of the container scenario
that no nuclear attack will be thwarted if the concealed weapon is never detected. As
such, it is useful to investigate the common properties of fissile material and the various
ways in which these properties can be exploited to remotely detect the presence of this
material without the luxury of having physical access to the inside of each cargo
container.
In the current context, a nuclide is defined as fissile if it can undergo neutron-
induced fission with the absorption of a neutron of any energy. The ability to fission
readily when interacting with neutrons of any energy regime makes fissile isotopes
critically important in producing and sustaining the fission chain reactions that give
nuclear weapons their explosive power. For the purposes of this analysis, fissile
materials will be generally defined as materials containing fissile isotopes in sufficient
quantities to make them suitable for use in nuclear weapons. Although nuclear weapons
can theoretically be constructed using more exotic materials, such as neptunium or
americium [Albright et. al, 1999], the following discussion will focus on materials that
contain the fissile isotopes 239pu, 235U, and 233U.
Natural uranium has an isotopic composition of 99.28% (by weight) 238U, 0.72%
235U, and 0.0055% 234U. Uranium is considered enriched if the abundance of the fissile
235 U constituent is artificially increased above its naturally occurring level. Uranium that
is greater than 20% 235U is classified as highly enriched. The 20% cutoff corresponds to
the minimum enrichment, as identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), required for materials that can be used in nuclear weapons [IAEA, 2001].
Unlike the fissile 235U isotope, 238U can only be made to fission with neutrons exceeding
a threshold energy of approximately 1 MeV [Krane, 1988]. This threshold makes
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uranium with a high 238U content unsuitable for creating and sustaining chain reactions
because not all neutrons produced during a given generation of fissions will exceed the
238U energy threshold and be available to create subsequent fission events. The
population of neutrons energetic enough to fission 238U would be further decreased as
neutrons undergo inelastic scattering events that transfer some of their energy to the
nuclei with which they interact. As a result, the highly enriched uranium (HEU) used in
nuclear weapons typically has an enrichment of greater than 90% 235U [Bunn et. al,
1997].
Plutonium, unlike uranium, is not a naturally occurring element and must be
produced artificially. Fissile 239 Pu is typically bred in a nuclear reactor through the
following transmutation chain and then chemically separated.
238U (n,y) >239 U 2d >239 Np 65 >239 P
23.5m P 56.5h
Weapons grade plutonium is rich in the fissile 239Pu isotope (again above 90%) and is
defined as containing less than 7% of the 240Pu isotope [DOE, 1994], which is considered
a contaminant by weapons designers. Reactor grade plutonium also contains 239Pu, but is
defined as containing greater than 7% 240pul . Each type of plutonium also contains
varying amounts of other plutonium isotopes including 238 Pu, 241pu, and 242pu. Although
weapons grade plutonium (as the name implies) is vastly preferable for use in fabricating
a nuclear weapon, reactor grade plutonium can also be used to produce an explosive that
delivers a nuclear yield2 [Mark et. al, 1987]. For this reason, and because a terrorist
organization is unlikely to be picky if an opportunity to obtain this material avails itself,
reactor grade plutonium has been included in the discussion, despite the added weapon
design and assembly difficulties associated with its use.
' Plutonium containing between 7 and 18% 2 4 0Pu is sometimes referred to as fuel grade.
2 In 1977 the United States declassified the existence of an underground test conducted in 1962 where a
nuclear device fabricated with reactor grade plutonium was successfully detonated.
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233U is not a constituent of naturally occurring uranium and, like plutonium, must
be produced artificially. This fissile nuclide is bred from thorium in nuclear reactors
through the following transmutation chain.
232 Th (n,) 233 Th - 233 Pa 6 >233 U22.3- 27.0d
Uranium bred and chemically separated from thorium blankets is contaminated with
varying amounts of 232U. 233U is not nearly as popular as 235U and 239 Pu for use in
nuclear weapons (no country is publicly known to have produced weapons using 233U
[NTI, 2003]) because of radiation dose concerns arising from the 232U contaminant.
However, this material is very capable of producing a nuclear explosion, evidenced by a
bare sphere critical mass3 smaller than that of 235U [NERAC, 2000]. Currently, the
worldwide availability of 233U is rather small compared to other fissile materials that are
likely being coveted by terrorist organizations. However, a number of countries, most
notably India (already a nuclear weapon state), are considering the use of a 233U-
producing thorium fuel cycle for nuclear power generation [Gopalakrishnan, 2002].
Despite their many physical, chemical, and metallurgical differences, fissile
materials have a number of common traits that can be used as a basis for detection. One
characteristic that is obviously shared by all fissile materials is that they can be made to
fission. When fissile materials are bombarded with neutrons of any energy or gamma
rays above a threshold energy4, fission (or so-called photo-fission in the case of gamma
bombardment) will occur and neutrons and prompt gamma rays will be released
immediately as a result of the fission event, followed by delayed gamma rays (and
occasionally delayed neutrons) emitted by subsequent decay and de-excitation of the
fission products. Unlike the heavy ionized fragments created during fission and the beta
particles that are typically emitted as these fission products decay toward stability,
neutrons and gammas are uncharged. Due to their lack of electronic charge, these
particles do not undergo Coulomb interactions with the atomic electrons of the matter
3 The bare sphere critical masses of 233U and 235U are 16.4 kg and 47.9 kg, respectively.
4For 235U and 239 Pu, the photo-fission threshold energy is about 5.3 MeV [Fetter(l), 1990]
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through which they pass so they can travel a relatively long distance before and between
interactions. The long-range nature (relative to other forms of nuclear radiation) of
neutrons and gammas makes them particularly well suited to the task of detecting fissile
material at a distance using conventional equipment and well-understood methods.
Another useful characteristic shared by all fissile materials is that they have high
densities, and are able to readily absorb gamma rays and neutrons. Densities of some
common weapons-grade fissile materials are shown in Table 2-1 [Mark et. al, 1987].
Table 2-1: Densities of common weapons-grade fissile materials
HEU Weapons Grade Pu
(94% U-235) alpha phase delta phase
18.7 g/cmA3 19.86 g/cmA3 15.6 g/cm^3
One way to quantify how effectively a material can absorb a particular type of radiation
is to define the mean free path of that radiation in the material. The mean free path is the
average distance traveled between interactions. Since each interaction creates the
opportunity for scattering or absorption, a short mean free path, or equivalently, more
average interactions per unit length, indicates that the material is effective in absorbing or
shielding that particular radiation. Table 2-1 below shows the mean free path ratios
between HEU and a number of other materials for neutrons and gamma rays of several
different energy regimes [Fetter(l), 1990].
Table 2-2: Ratios of MFPs in selected materials to HEU
Energy Ratio of MFP in element to that in HEU
MeV C Al Fe W Pb
0.4 22 19 6.7 1.4 2.0
Gamma Rays 10 23 16 4.3 1.1 1.8
100 56 27 5.5 1.1 1.7
thermal 50 240 24 40 70
Neutrons 0.001 3.0 16 2.2 1.6 4.1
10 2.2 2.4 1.5 0.94 1.5
Ratios in Table 2-1 greater than unity indicate a larger mean free path in the reference
material than in HEU. Plutonium with its similar density, atomic number, and ability to
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fission (even with thermal neutrons) would produce comparably small mean free paths
for gamma rays and neutrons at energies tabulated above.
Fissile materials are also radioactive. However, since each type of fissile material
has a distinct isotopic composition, which in turn gives rise to distinct populations of
decay progeny, each of the materials produce intrinsic radiation signatures that can differ
in terms of character and intensity. The characteristic emission signatures for each type
of fissile material will now be identified and discussed separately in the context of how
they can be used to facilitate remote detection.
2.1.1 HEURadiation Signature
The isotopic composition of a radioactive material determines both the nature and
energy of the radiation emitted. Therefore to begin discussing the radiation signature of
HEU, the general composition of this material must first be revisited in greater detail.
The primary constituents of HEU are the naturally occurring 238U, 235U, and 234U
isotopes. To produce weapons-usable material, some means of enrichment (e.g. gaseous
diffusion or centrifuge enrichment) must be employed to artificially raise the relative
abundance of the fissile 235U isotope to well above its natural level of 0.72%. Because
most means of enrichment exploit the fractional mass differences between isotopes, the
trace amount of 234U found in natural uranium is also preferentially enriched along with
235U due to its comparatively low atomic mass. If none of the material used as input, or
feedstock, to the enrichment process had ever been irradiated in a nuclear reactor, than
the naturally occurring nuclides listed above would be the only uranium isotopes present
in the resulting HEU. However, if even a minute fraction of the enrichment feedstock
had been irradiated (and subsequently reprocessed), the HEU output would likely be
contaminated with small amounts of the non-naturally occurring 232U, 236U, and 237U
isotopes [Peurrung, 1998].
As the 235U, 238U, and 234U isotopes (as well as the 232U, 236U, and 237U
contaminants that may be present) begin down their long decay chains toward stable
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nuclides, alpha and beta particles are emitted as individual nuclei decay. While these
short-range, charged particles are generally unhelpful for remote detection, the long-
range characteristic photons that often accompany these decays can be usefully exploited.
The gamma rays emitted as the excited daughter nuclei created during alpha or beta
decay transition to lower excited states or their ground states, give rise to a rich and
complex spectrum of photons that can penetrate surrounding material and be detected at a
physically removed location. Since gamma ray energies are determined by the
characteristics of the emitting nucleus, peaks in the measured spectrum can be used to
unambiguously identify the presence of specific isotopes. The HEU spectrum, as
measured using a high resolution, high purity germanium (HPGe) detector, is shown in
Figure 2-1 [Gosnell, 2000].
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Figure 2-1: High resolution HEU spectrum
As indicated by the magnified region of Figure 2-1, the characteristic gamma
lines emitted by 235 U are concentrated at the low energy end of the spectrum. The most
intense of the 59 discrete lines emitted by 23 5U is at 186 keV and the most energetic line




not highly penetrating because most types of matter have large linear attenuation
coefficients in this energy regime, with a particularly large contribution from the photon-
absorbing photoelectric process. Figure 2-2 shows the dominant regions for various
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Figure 2-2: Dominant regions for different photon interactions
As a result of the high probability of photoelectric interaction, which results in the loss of
the photon in the process, dense matter shields low energy gamma lines emitted by 235U
very efficiently. In uranium the mean free path of 200 keV gamma rays is 0.5 mm, so a
significant fraction of these low energy photons are subject to self-absorption within the
HEU from with they originate [Fetter(2), 1990].
The most notable contribution to the HEU spectrum stemming from residual 238U
is the 1001 keV line arising from the isomeric transition of 234 mPa that is created through
the following series of decays.
a >234 Th d >234m Pa
4.5 Gy 24.3d
Although this line is highly penetrating and emitted with reasonably high intensity, the
use of gamma rays that arise from 238U (or its daughters) for fissile material detection
26
purposes is inherently problematic. This is due in part to the fact that the presence of
238 U doesn't necessarily indicate the presence of HEU. Additionally, the ubiquitous
nature of the 238U isotope, particularly in terrestrial settings, produces a significant
amount of nuisance background that can confound detection efforts.
Because gamma lines emitted by 235U are intense but not highly penetrating and
lines emitted by 238U (and its daughters) are less than ideal for fissile material detection,
gamma emissions stemming from the decay of 232U and its daughter products can prove
extremely useful for remote detection applications. 232U is produced primarily through
the following reactions in a nuclear reactor [Peurrung, 1998].
(1) 235 U a 231 Th 231 (n) 232 Pa >232 U
704My 25.5h 31.4h
(2) '234 U a >230 Th (r) 231 Th V >231 Pa (ny) >232 Pa >232 U
246ky 25.5h 31 .4 h
(3) 235U (n,y) >236 U (n,y) >237 U > 237 Np n,2n) >6.8 > 2
236m Np a- >236 PU a >232 U
(4) 238 U (n,2n) >237 U >237 Np ,2 ) >236m Np - >236 PU a >232 U
6.8d '1 22.5h 2.9y
The reactions shown above (particularly the first two listed) are the most significant
pathways by which 232U is produced in a reactor, provided that actinide impurities arising
from previous irradiations have been removed from the initial fuel prior to loading
[Perrung, 1998]. If present in HEU, 232U will decay through a long chain of successive
alpha and beta decays through the so-called thorium series depicted below in Figure 2-3
[Krane, 1988].
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Figure 2-3: Thorium series
The thorium series is shown in detail because several of the distant daughter products of
23 2 U emit high energy, highly penetrating gamma lines that can significantly enhance the
distance at which HEU can be remotely detected. Of the daughter products found in the
thorium series, the one with the most utility for detection is 208T1. The beta decay of 208T1
to stable 208Pb is accompanied by one or more high-energy photons emitted as the
daughter nucleus de-excites. Table 2-2 shows the energies of the most intense gamma
ray lines produced by 208T1 decay, as well as the branching ratios of these lines [Fetter(3),
1990].
Table 2-3: 208TI gamma lines and branching ratios
Gamma Energy Branching Ratio






Because of their significant branching ratios and highly penetrating nature, the 583 and
2615 keV 208T1 gamma lines can be particularly useful in detecting HEU that is
contaminated with the 232U parent nuclide, even if 232U is found in concentrations less
than 1 ppb [Fetter(1), 1990]. The prominence of these two peaks in the HEU spectrum
can be seen in Figure 2-1. The 2615 keV photon is especially noteworthy because photon
interaction cross-sections at this energy are generally quite low, which allows this gamma
line to be powerfully penetrating and quite long range. Also, as shown in Figure 2-2 the
Compton scattering process dominates the overall interaction cross-section at 2615 keV,
so even when an interaction does take place, the photon will most likely be scattered
(albeit losing some energy in the process) instead of absorbed. Additionally, in general,
the background rate in this high-energy region of the spectrum is fairly low, so a source
that emits gammas in this regime can usually be detected more easily than a low energy
gamma emitter. Unfortunately, as the thorium series in Figure 2-3 demonstrates, 232U is
not the only potential source of 208T1 and its 2615 keV decay photon. 232Th, an isotope
that represents greater than 99% of naturally occurring thorium and is 3 times more
abundant in the earth's crust than natural uranium [WNA, 2003], also decays down to
208Tl and can produce a very strong background signal, which inhibits confident detection
of HEU.
Like many other extremely heavy isotopes, 238U and 234U can undergo
spontaneous fission. In general, spontaneous fission is more likely in nuclides with even
numbers of protons and neutrons and becomes increasingly important as atomic number
increases. However, it does not seriously compete with alpha emission as the dominant
decay process until atomic mass increases above about 250 [Krane, 1988]. As a result,
238U and 234U both have partial half-lives for spontaneous fission that are significantly
longer than their total half-lives. (Partial half-lives are defined as the time necessary for
half of the nuclei in a given sample to decay if only a single specified decay process were
allowed to occur.) 238U has a partial half life for spontaneous fission of 8.20x1015 yr
versus a total half life of 4.468x 109 yr and 2 34 U has a spontaneous fission half life of
2.04x1016 yr versus a total half life of 2.455x10 5 yr [Fetter(4), 1990].
29
Several other processes contribute to neutron generation in HEU. One is the
production of neutrons through (a,n) reactions that can occur when light element
impurities (e.g. carbon and oxygen) in the material interact with alpha particles emitted
by the uranium nuclides and their daughter products [Fetter(2), 1990]. The other process
influencing the neutron population in HEU is the multiplication that occurs when an
existing neutron induces fission in the fissile material thereby releasing additional
neutrons. The degree of multiplication is strongly dependant on the geometry of the
material.
Despite the effects of multiplication and the neutron production that could occur
due to (a,n) reactions in light element contaminated material, spontaneous fission events
in 238U and 234U occur infrequently enough that the intrinsic neutron signature of HEU is
very small and essentially undetectable for the remote detection application of interest.
2.1.2 Plutonium Radiation Signature
Both weapons grade and reactor grade plutonium contain essentially the same
plutonium isotopes (238pu, 2 39 Pu, 240pU, 24 1pu and 24 2 Pu) but in different concentrations.
Weapons grade plutonium is typically composed of greater than 93% 239Pu, around 6%
24 0Pu, and small quantities (less than 1%) of 238 Pu, 241pu, and 2 42pu [Fetter(1), 1990].
Reactor grade plutonium, a material that does not have uniquely specified isotopics, has
been produced and separated from higher burnup fuel than weapons grade plutonium,
giving it a lower concentration of 239Pu and higher relative concentrations of the 238Pu,
240pu, 241pu, and 242 Pu isotopes [Mark, 1990].
All of the plutonium isotopes identified above are radioactive, and just as in the
case with HEU, the alpha and beta decays undergone by these isotopes and their daughter
products are accompanied by the emission of one or more characteristic photons. The
most prominent gamma lines in the plutonium spectrum arise from the decay of 239pu,
and the decay of the 241pu isotope's daughter product. 239 Pu is an alpha emitter with a
half-life of 2.41 lx105 yr. The two most intense gamma lines arising from the 239 Pu alpha
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decay are at 375 and 414 keV with branching ratios (% per decay) of 0.00158 and
0.00151 respectively [Fetter(3), 1990]. The most energetic line emitted by 239 Pu with a
useful intensity is at 769 keV, and has a branching ratio of 0.000011. 241 Pu has a half-life
of 14.35 yr and beta decays to 24 1Am 99.9976% of the time [Oetting, 1968]. The 241Am
daughter then alpha decays with a 432.2 yr half-life emitting gammas at 662, 721.96 and
722.70 keV with respective branching ratios of 0.00036, 0.00006 and 0.00013 [Fetter(3),
1990]. The peak energies of the later two photons are exceedingly difficult to resolve,
using even high-quality semiconductor detectors, because the peak energies are so close
together. As such, the counts from these two photons can be aggregated into one peak
centered at approximately 722.5 keV, with a combined branching ratio of 0.00019. Table
2-4 shows the decay rates of the gamma emissions discussed above5 [Fetter(3), 1990].
Table 2-4: Decay rates for selected gamma emissions from plutonium and its daughters
Parent Isotope Gamma Energy Decay Rate






In the case of weapons grade plutonium, the 239 Pu and 241Am gamma lines
identified above can be fairly helpful for remote detection due to their reasonable
intensity and good penetrating power in most materials. Since reactor grade plutonium
has a significantly higher concentration of both 241pu and 241Am, the highly penetrating
662 and (averaged) 722.5 keV can become quite intense. Consequently these gamma
lines can be extremely helpful in remotely detecting reactor grade material.
It should also be noted that because 239 Pu and 241 Am are not naturally occurring
isotopes, the detection of plutonium using the gamma lines discussed above does not
suffer from the same problems associated with natural background that can complicate
HEU detection. However, 241Am is used in commercial products such as smoke detectors
5 Decay rates in Table 2-4 assume 10-year-old plutonium (i.e. 10 years of decay time starting with I g of
the pure parent nuclides).
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and the popular radiation source 13 7Cs, emits a gamma ray at 661 keV, which is
essentially indistinguishable from the 662 keV line emitted by 241 Am. Although the
spectral peak overlap with 137Cs could frustrate unambiguous identification of 241Am, the
unexpected detection of this line emanating from a cargo container would still
presumably be of intense interest due to the potential use of 137Cs (particularly in its
powdery chloride form [Stone, 2002]) in a radiological dispersion device.
A potentially more important aspect of plutonium's intrinsic radiation signature,
in terms of remote detection, is neutron emission. Plutonium has a high rate of internal
neutron generation due largely to the spontaneous fissioning of its nuclei. All of the
plutonium nuclides present in weapons grade and reactor grade materials undergo
spontaneous fission more readily (i.e. they have shorter spontaneous fission partial half
lives) than 238U [Fetter(4), 1990]. The 238pu, 240pu, and 242Pu nuclides, with their even
number of protons and neutrons, are particularly active contributors to the neutron
population with relatively short spontaneous fission partial half lives of 4.77x 101°,
1.31 x 10, and 6.84x10 10 years respectively [Fetter(4), 1990].
As is the case with HEU, alpha particles interacting with light element impurities
can cause (a,n) reactions, giving rise to another potentially important neutron production
mechanism. However, reactions of the (a,n) variety are more significant in plutonium
than HEU because the dramatically higher alpha activity in plutonium creates more
opportunity for these reactions to occur. Likewise, neutron multiplication can also play a
more significant role in plutonium because more spontaneous fission and (a,n) neutrons
are present to begin the multiplication process by inducing fission.
There is also some evidence to suggest that a significantly enhanced high-energy
(above 1.6 MeV) gamma flux can be observed in the vicinity of plutonium-based nuclear
weapons [Baryshevsky et. al, 1994]. These energetic photons would most likely be the
result of radiative capture reactions occurring as materials in the surrounding chemical
high explosive absorb neutrons emitted by the plutonium. Due to the low natural
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background flux in this energy regime, these highly penetrating gamma rays could prove
quite useful for remote detection.
2.1.3 23 3U Radiation Signature
The isotopic composition of uranium that is chemically separated from thorium
targets irradiated in a reactor varies depending on the reactor type and burnup. Although
the relative concentrations may vary, all uranium produced from thorium irradiation will
be contaminated with 232U produced primarily through the following reaction chains.
232Th (n,2n) >231 Th fl >231 Pa (ny) >232 Pa A3- >232 U
232Th (n,y) >233 Th A- >233 Pa - >233 U (n,2n) >232 U
The limiting reactions for both 232U production mechanisms are the (n,2n) reactions that
have threshold neutron energies of around 6 MeV. As a result, uranium bred in reactors
with relatively large neutron populations in the high-energy (i.e. > 6 MeV) portion of the
spectrum will typically be contaminated with higher levels of 232U. 232U contamination
also increases with burnup [Kang, 2001].
As noted above for HEU, 232U, with its 69.8 yr half-life and its 208T1 progeny can be
very helpful for remote detection even at 232U contamination levels on the order of 100
ppt. In contrast to the minute concentrations of 232U that can be found in contaminated
HEU, 233U is considered to be "clean" if it has levels of 232U contamination less than 1
ppm. [Kang, 2001]. The intense radiation field given off by the 232U decay chain is the
root of radiation protection concerns that have kept 233U from being pursued by states as
the basis for nuclear weapons production. This intense, high-energy radiation will also
help to facilitate fairly straightforward remote detection of concealed 233U.
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2.2 Detection Techniques
Detection techniques that seek to exploit the common properties of fissile material
discussed in the previous section can be generally categorized as either active or passive.
Active methods involve the application of external radiation sources to induce fission
events in fissile material that may be present or to take photon transmission
measurements that can indicate the presence and location of dense materials. Passive
techniques do not probe with radiation, but instead measure the intrinsic radiation emitted
by the fissile material to achieve detection. Methods using both active and passive
techniques will now be discussed in additional detail and their applicability to the
postulated container scenario will be assessed.
2.2.1 Active Detection
There are a number of disparate detection methods that fall under the category of
active techniques. The commonality between these methods is that they all employ some
dedicated photon or neutron source to bombard an object or material with intense
radiation to measure its response. In some cases the response of interest is the induced
radiation emitted by the object or material being interrogated and in other cases the
measured response is the amount of radiation that is effectively transmitted through (or
absorbed in) the test object. Methods concerned with stimulating radiation in fissile
material using external radiation sources will be referred to here as induced fission
techniques and methods that measure radiation transmission will be referred to as
radiography.
2.2.1.1 Induced Fission
As discussed earlier, fissile materials can be made to fission with neutrons of any
energy and by gamma rays above certain nuclide-specific threshold energies. Fission
events are accompanied by the emission of about 7 prompt gamma rays and anywhere
between 2 to 5 prompt neutrons depending on the isotope undergoing fission and the type
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and energy of the particle that induced the event [Fetter(4), 1990]. Induced fission
techniques interrogate an object with intense beams of radiation and detect evidence of
induced fission in the form of prompt neutrons and/or gammas.
Induced fission techniques have a number of attractive attributes. The intense
probing radiation can penetrate significant amounts of intervening material such that even
well-shielded fissile material can normally be detected. Additionally, by artificially
inducing a strong signal that is unique to the class of materials that are being screened
for, induced fission techniques require a much smaller detection time than other methods,
particularly those that are passive in nature. Disadvantages associated with this method
include radiation protection concerns for workers and bystanders stemming from the use
of intense and energetic radiation sources. An additional concern for methods that would
employ neutrons as probing radiation arises from the possible activation of benign
materials in the test object.
In terms of suitability to the container scenario, induced fission techniques are not
a particularly desirable option. Although the ability to detect fissile material despite
shielding is an important virtue of this method, the insult to the device arising from the
bombardment of probing radiation is a critical drawback. A booby-trap provision, such
as the one postulated by the container scenario, could be triggered by intense radiation
resulting in detonation of the weapon.
2.2.1.2 Radiography
As photons pass through material they can interact with surrounding matter
through a number of different processes. The most notable of these photon interactions
are photoelectric absorption, Compton scattering, and (if the photon has an energy greater
than 1.022 MeV) pair production. Examples of photon interaction cross-sections for
aluminum and lead, illustrating the energy dependence of the three primary interaction
processes, are shown in Figure 2-4 [Krane, 1988].
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Figure 2-4: Photon interaction cross-sections for aluminum and lead
The denser the material being traversed by a photon, the more matter is available
to cause these interactions per unit length traveled. As such, a test object with unknown
contents can be exposed to a beam of photons with a known intensity and transmission
measurements can be carried out to detect the presence of particularly dense material,
which could indicate the presence of either fissile material or shielding. Sophisticated
radiographic techniques can image the contents of an unknown test object using the
contrast provided by the varying linear attenuation coefficients of different materials.
These contrast images can be used to indicate both the presence and geometry of
suspicious dense material.
An advantage of radiography is that it can provide visual insights into the contents
of sealed, opaque containers without requiring them to be physically opened. The
sensitivity to very dense materials could also easily detect the presence of engineered
shielding. However, high densities are not unique to fissile materials or shielding that is
being used to conceal a nuclear weapon. As such, this method (and other more exotic
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radiographic methods including those using muons) could be prone to high false alarm
rates that could create a potentially costly commercial choke point. Additionally, the
bombardment of high-energy photons can damage some radiation-sensitive types of
commercial cargo, such as photographic film.
Evaluated in terms of the container scenario, radiography warrants an assessment
similar to that of induced fission techniques. The ability to readily detect the presence of
material that could be used as shielding is desirable (although unlike induced fission
methods, radiography cannot unambiguously detect the presence of fissile material
behind potential shielding). However, the overall desirability of this technique, at least
with respect to the postulated container scenario, is severely limited by the fact that the
bombardment of a booby-trapped nuclear device with intense external radiation could
trigger the weapon.
2.2.2 Passive Detection
Whereas active techniques use externally applied radiation to exploit common
properties of fissile material related to fissionability and density, passive techniques focus
on the intrinsic radiation that is emitted in varying forms by all fissile material as a means
of detection. Using large static arrays of gamma and neutron detectors to obtain gross
count measurements can identify the presence of a radiation source. This technique
cannot, however, discriminate between fissile material and any other type of radiation
emitting material. More advanced techniques using gamma spectroscopy can be used to
detect and identify individual types of fissile material.
By relying on intrinsic radiation emitted by fissile material instead of radiation
induced by powerful external sources, passive techniques are non-invasive and do not
present radiation protection concerns. However, the intrinsic signal emitted by fissile
material is significantly less intense than the signal that can be artificially induced using
active methods. In general, the number of counts detected from an isotropic point source
can be expressed as follows,
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SAet -'ii (1)
where is the int nsity of a poi t s urce, A is the detector a ea normal to the incident2
where S is the intensity of a point source, A is the detector area normal to the incident
radiation, e is the detector efficiency, t is count time, r is the linear distance between the
source and the detector, /u is the linear attenuation coefficient of a given intervening
material, and ris the thickness of a given intervening material. The situation described




Figure 2-5: Schematic representation of source detection through intervening material
Assuming that the detector or detectors will be placed as close to the source as the
situation permits and that detectors with efficiencies as high as feasible were employed,
Eq. (1) shows that the only remaining options for increasing the magnitude of the
detected signal are to increase the effective detector area or increase the count time. As a
result, either large detectors, arrays of detectors, long count times or some combination
thereof are likely to be required to make a confident detection of fissile material using
passive techniques. An additional difficulty encountered using passive detection methods
arises from the relative ease with which the low energy characteristic gamma emissions
from some types of fissile material (most notably HEU with very limited or no 232U
contamination) can be shielded by dense materials. Shielding can cause already weak
intrinsic signals to become even weaker and can be a serious obstacle to confident
detection.
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Assessed against the container scenario, passive techniques have the critical
advantage of not perturbing radiation-sensitive booby-traps in the course of detection.
The trade-off for this desirable attribute is the potential for significantly longer count
times if the weakly penetrating intrinsic radiation from fissile material is to be detected
despite the presence of intentional shielding. Increased count times may or may not be
tolerable.
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Chapter 3: Detection Schemes
3.1 Current Approaches
The preceding section discussed general methods for detecting concealed fissile
material without consideration for how and where within the international container
shipping architecture these techniques could be implemented. Identifying suitable
deployment strategies for selected detection techniques is often complicated by the
potentially competing interests of enhancing security and preserving the free flow of
commerce. A number of deployment approaches seeking to strike a balance between
security and commerce have been envisioned or even implemented. Some of the more
prominent approaches that have been proposed or realized to date will now be discussed
in terms of their abilities to address the conservative postulated threat.
3.1.1 Customs-Based Approach
The vast majority of detection schemes that are currently deployed or slated for
deployment, can be generally characterized as customs-based approaches. These
approaches strive to integrate detection systems using either active or passive techniques
into existing infrastructure elements at U.S. ports. Examples include outfitting cranes
that transfer containers from cargo vessels onto shore with passive large-area detectors,
processing incoming containers through inspection facilities where they are subjected to
active interrogation, or using mobile detection units to scan containers with photons for
signs of fissile material. The development of in-port detection regimes, such as the
examples cited above, represents a natural extension of conventional strategies based on
the customs model for finding and seizing contraband as the material is coming into the
country. Nuclear weapons, however, are utterly unlike conventional forms of contraband
due to the power and range of their effects. As such, when an attack is mounted by a
rational and determined adversary, the discovery of a nuclear weapon in a major U.S.
port simply cannot ensure protection from the device's destructive power and reach.
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3.1.2 "Smart" Containers
Another approach that has been vigorously discussed recently is the deployment
of so-called "smart" containers. This approach would retrofit containers used for
maritime commerce with small radiation detectors to sense the presence of concealed
fissile material. Aside from the extremely daunting logistical challenges that would be
presented by installing, maintaining, and mentoring detection equipment in the
approximately 11 million [WSC, 2003] cargo containers in circulation worldwide, there
are a number of critical limitations associated with this approach. First, the detectors
employed in "smart" containers would be very susceptible to tampering. It is the sender
who loads and seals the cargo container prior to shipment, so if a "smart container"
approach was adopted and it was well known that each container was outfitted with a
small detector or detectors, the enemy would have ample opportunity to disable or defeat
the detection devices given their unlimited access to the container prior to shipment.
Even if an enemy did not successfully defeat the detector or if sensors in neighboring
containers detected radiation, the presence of a threat would still not be known until the
container entered port unless the alarm could be communicated in a quasi-real time
fashion. Equipping all containers with detectors that can transmit alarm information
would most likely render the "smart" container approach cost prohibitive. Therefore, like
customs-based approaches, "smart" containers would not identify the presence of a
nuclear weapon until it has already reached a U.S. port, which is not adequately
protective when faced with a sophisticated and determined adversary.
These and other current approaches that subscribe to the conventional notion that
threats can be successfully detected and interdicted as they enter the country (in this case
when the threat has come ashore in port) are critically flawed because they do not take
into account the unique destructive dimensions of the nuclear threat they seek to address.
Even if they make detections with perfectly reliability, these approaches and any others
that propose to look for fissile material in containers that have already entered port cannot
ensure that a nuclear detonation that physically impacts the United States can be
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prevented. Therefore, with respect to the challenges posed by the threat of container-
borne nuclear attack, these approaches do not meet the ultimate success criterion.
3.2 Ship-Based Approach
3.2.1 Attributes
The primary drawbacks of the approaches discussed above relate to the critical
issue of how and where defensive measures are to be deployed. For conventional
contraband, shipping ports are logical locations to field inspection and detection
capabilities because they represent choke points where many elements (i.e. containers) of
a generally diffuse threat (i.e. container borne contraband) come together. Domestic
ports are also convenient deployment nodes because, unlike foreign ports and
commercially owned property, the U.S. government has wide access to the facilities and
infrastructure. To ensure protection from the effects of nuclear weapons, however, the
threat must be interdicted prior to reaching, or even coming into range of, U.S. shores.
Large ocean-going container vessels represent another choke point where many
cargo containers, each representing a potential threat, come together en route to the
United States. If the presence of a concealed nuclear weapon could be detected and
communicated while the ship carrying it was still at sea, a defensive response could be
mounted while the threat was still safely removed from U.S. shores. The U.S.
government cannot unilaterally deploy and maintain control over detection equipment
deployed on the actual vessels themselves since they are the property and dominion of
private concerns. However, akin to the terrorists who may seek to exploit it as an avenue
of attack, the U.S. government does have access to the open architecture of international
maritime commerce that allows any party to ship containers to and from just about any
destination aboard these ships.
Therefore, Gallagher at MIT has proposed an approach whereby suites of
commercial off the shelf (COTS) gamma and neutron detectors are mounted inside
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standard, non-descript cargo containers. These dedicated units could then be shipped
clandestinely using existing commercial channels where they would be deployed
alongside potentially threat-bearing containers aboard vessels sailing for U.S. ports. On
board the container ship, the detection units will be able to utilize passive neutron
counting and imaging-enhanced gamma spectroscopy techniques to detect and potentially
identify any threat-related nuclear signature being emitted from nearby containers with a
count time constrained only by the duration of the voyage. The containerized detection
units would also be outfitted with a transmission capability such that the presence of
potential threats could be communicated as they were detected and prior to entering U.S.
ports. The primary advantages of this "ship-based approach" can be summarized as
sensitivity, stealth, and most importantly, standoff.
3.2.1.1 Sensitivity
Characteristics of the ship-based deployment environment and the containerized
detection units themselves combine to promote good detection sensitivity. Standard full-
sized cargo containers, which would be used to house detectors, have dimensions
measuring 40' in length, 8' in width and 8.5' in height. The 2720 ft3 interior volume of
these containers provides ample space to mount neutron detection equipment and arrays
of gamma detectors that can be configured to present a large effective area when viewed
from any incident direction. Additionally, the long transoceanic voyages required to ship
containers from many foreign ports of call to U.S. shores provide extremely long count
times. From most foreign ports, count times of a week or more would be available.
Referring back to Eq. (1), it is clear that a large detector area and very long count
times will enhance signal strength and help to offset the unknown and variable distance to
the fissile source. However, the signal strength defined in Eq. (1) is not the only relevant
factor in confidently detecting the presence of fissile material. Background radiation
being emitted by benign sources can mimic or obscure the emissions from a genuine
threat. Two particularly problematic contributors of background radiation are cosmic ray
induced neutrons and naturally occurring radionuclides. Cosmic rays, composed
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primarily of energetic protons and alpha particles, produce neutrons predominantly
through spallation interactions with matter [Frank et. al, 2000]. The distributed neutron
background flux at an interface between air and iron (e.g. on the deck of a containership)
has been found to be approximately 12 times greater than the background flux at an
interface between air and ground [O'Brien, et. al, 1978]. This distributed neutron
background enhancement, sometimes referred to as the "Ship Effect", is the result of a
massive object composed of dense material (e.g. iron) serving as an effective medium for
the production of cosmic ray-induced neutrons. Naturally occurring uranium and thorium
can also frustrate detection efforts because these radioactive materials and their daughter
products produce characteristic gamma emissions that are identical in energy to those
emitted by some fissile materials of interest. Unlike many terrestrial settings, the
uranium and thorium concentrations of seawater are small at 3.3 p.g/L [Turekian, 1976]
and 9.2 ng/L [Emsley, 1998] respectively, and these concentrations are not expected to
fluctuate substantially. Therefore the background sources likely to interfere with ship-
based fissile material detection are diffuse uranium and thorium impurities in the ship's
structural steel and distributed benign sources in commercial containers. Imaging
techniques provide a means for identifying localization of incident radiation. As a result,
threatening point-like sources can be distinguished from the benign distributed
background sources described above.
3.2.1.2 Stealth
The nondescript nature of the containerized ship-based detection systems allows
these units to operate surreptitiously. The stealth afforded by these sealed, containerized
units will frustrate attempts by adversaries to disable or defeat the embedded detection
equipment. Additionally, while the exact number and location of the detection units
would not be obvious to an enemy, the knowledge that they are operationally deployed
may produce sufficient uncertainty regarding mission success to dissuade the enemy from
using this means of delivery. This could achieve an important degree of deterrence.
3.2.1.3 Standoff
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The most important advantage of the ship-based approach is the physical location
of the material when a positive detection is made and communicated. Instead of
identifying the presence of concealed fissile material once it has already entered the
country, a ship-based approach could detect the presence of a threat while the container
was still safely removed from American shores. The warning time provided by a
transmitter equipped, ship-based detection system would allow protective measures to be
taken to ensure that a minimum level of standoff distance between the container vessel
and the United States coastline could be established and maintained. Not only would
early warning prevent a concealed weapon from ever becoming a threat to the American
homeland, it would also ensure that responders had the greatest possible degree of
flexibility in how to safely contain and neutralize the threat.
3.2.2 External Uncertainties
It is difficult to overstate the critical advantages of a system that uses COTS
equipment and well understood techniques to provide advance detection and notification
of an incoming container borne nuclear threat. However, before the effectiveness,
reliability, and practicality of this conceptual approach can be persuasively demonstrated,
a number of important remaining uncertainties must be investigated and resolved. Some
of these uncertainties involve aspects of design and performance verification concerned
with elements internal to the containerized detection units. Other uncertainties are
external to the detection units and relate to facets of the international shipping trade and
characteristics of the deployment environment. A concerted effort is underway to
remove or constrain these uncertainties and to produce defensible assessments of the
efficacy and viability of the ship-based approach. Research and development activities
supporting this effort have been roughly divided along the lines of whether they address
uncertainties that are internal or external to the detection units. The remainder of this
thesis will address some of the more pressing external uncertainties. These uncertainties
include the count times available on container voyages originating from different regions
of the world, the number of detection units needed to adequately cover a vessel of a given
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size, and the number of detection units needed for a fully deployed system. Internal
uncertainties are being investigated by Gallagher at MIT and are outside the scope of this
thesis. Some important internal issues that are explicitly excluded are detection suite
design and quantification of internal performance parameters such as the expected
maximum distance (or range) at which a detection unit will be able to confidently and
reliably detect fissile sources under realistic conditions. Although concerns internal to
the detection unit will not be addressed here, there is an extremely high degree of
coordination and collaboration between the two functional areas and as work is produced
on one track it is immediately fed into ongoing activities on the parallel track.
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Chapter 4: Container Shipping and Cargo Analysis
Some important uncertainties associated with a ship-based detection regime
cannot be meaningfully addressed and resolved outside the context of the international
container trade and its attendant infrastructure, equipment, and cargo diversity. The
following analysis seeks to gain insights into relevant external uncertainties by examining
the imported container traffic at U.S. ports and deconstructing it terms of where the
containers came from, how far containers traveled to get here, what kinds of vessels (with
respect to container capacity and speed) were used to transport them, and what are the
relevant material properties of the cargo found within them.
4.1 Container Shipping Overview
In 2003, commercial vessels of all types, including tankers, bulk material carriers,
vehicle transports, and containerships, made 56,759 calls at U.S. ports [MARAD(1),
2004]. Containerships accounted for 17,271 (31.7%) of these calls with 1,025 separate
vessels importing over 13,900,000 containers, measured in twenty-foot equivalent units6
(TEUs). In the same year, containerships averaged about 17 calls per vessel and had an
average nominal capacity of 3,144 TEU. Table 4-1 shows the volume of imported and
exported containers that are processed through the top 30 U.S. ports in 2003
[MARAD(2), 2004].
6 Cargo containers come in lengths of 20', 40', and 45'. For the sake of normalization, TEU is the standard
measure for container statistics even though 40' containers are the most commonly used. A TEU is





































































Table 4-2 shows the origin and volume of containers imported in 2003 from the top 25

















































































































Table 4-2: Foreign container import data (CY 2003)
Country Imports Total Trade
of Origin (TEU x 1000) (TEU x 1000)
China 4447 5656


















Costa Rica 166 245
Philippines 141 221





All Others 1880 3650
Grand Total 13899 21287
4.2 Count Time
The amount of available count time is a critical factor in determining the efficacy
of the proposed ship-based approach. Count times for ship-based detection are
constrained only by the duration of the containership voyage. The voyage time between
any two ports is determined primarily by the total nautical distance between the ports of
interest and the average speed of the vessel. The following focuses on nautical distances
between ports and vessel speeds separately and then combines the results of these
analyses to derive defensible count time estimates for container shipments originating
anywhere in the world.
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4.2.1 Distance Between Ports
The nautical distance a vessel travels between a foreign port and a given U.S. port
is dominated by the location of the originating port and world geography (i.e. intervening
land masses). This distance, however, can also be heavily influenced by the number of
intermediate calls made between the ports of interest and by the size of the containership.
Many international shipping lines offer regularly scheduled service routes that call on
multiple ports en route to the United States. These additional port calls add distance to
the overall voyage and each call results in some idle time while the ship is berthed during
the container discharge and loading process. The size of containerships is relevant to the
travel distance because some important navigational short cuts have physical dimensions
that limit the size of vessels that can safely access them. The most important of these
size-limited navigational conveniences for containerships is the Panama Canal, which has
a 32.2 m maximum width restriction [Ircha, 2002]. Vessels with a beam width exceeding
this dimension (i.e. vessels that can fit more than 13 containers across the weather deck)
cannot transit the canal and must instead sail around the tip of South America. Despite
the additional voyage distances, economies of scale associated with larger, higher
capacity vessels drove many international shipping companies to build containerships
with deck widths that exceed 32.2 m [Wijnolst, 1999]. These so-called "Post-Panamax"
vessels, with capacities greater than 4,000 TEU, now account for 30% of the worldwide
containership fleet, by capacity [Tozer, 2003].
Several important assumptions were made prior to carrying out distance to port
calculations that would ultimately serve as input to count time estimates. First, New
York was selected as a representative destination for the east coast of the United States
and Los Angeles was chosen as a representative west coast destination port. In addition
to being the largest U.S. ports on their respective coasts, these ports were chosen because
their proximity to large urban population centers with vast cultural and economic
significance presumably makes them especially attractive targets for attack. Another
assumption was that all voyages made from foreign ports to the reference ports (i.e. New
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York and Los Angeles) were direct, with no intermediate calls. This assumption was
made to ensure conservatism, since intervening port calls add time and distance to the
voyage. Finally, it was assumed that the originating port used in a nuclear attack (i.e. the
port from which a fully functional device is operationally deployed to the United States)
could be anywhere in the world.
A total of 133 foreign ports were included in the distance analysis. An effort was
made to select a set of foreign ports that provided reasonably comprehensive coverage of
the world's navigable coastlines when taken as a whole. Therefore, some ports were
selected for inclusion because of their prominence in the international container trade
(e.g. Singapore and Hong Kong), and others were chosen to fill in geographical gaps. By
providing quasi-continuous coastal coverage, the distance from any port not included in
this analysis can be reasonably approximated by interpolation. Figures 4-1 through 4-8
show the geographic locations [Hammond, 1999] of the selected ports by region.
51
., N , . , i
- , {'r.'tl i '
'~~~~~~- ~ :
;~ ix. .. ·..- .. ..
)Mr ,,.LuNW~~ ~~ .Ep" > - t
·UBM .,er . 3Q;:
iX ms ::Xv 1~e , > r uvr
vrL - -.. ir
__ a. .Ue .'., "Mm,' , '" 
,bm UNbtE STAESP. CkOVbma' !SCleu
,'4t2 . i.* U N' l.E D S T A T EO. ', ' cd~,omUw rFsi ' b i '
-g,," t ° I1-s B-wV. Of4 Wv b1 --iD ,ilv? .'..
North America
Map Number Port Country
1 Halifax Canada
2 Prince Rupert Canada
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Central America / Caribbean
Map Number Port Country Map Number Port Country
3 Havana Cuba 22 Georgetown French Guyana
4 Kingston Jamaica 23 Paramaribo Suriname
5 Port au Prince Haiti 24 Natal Brazil
6 Santo Domingo Dom. Rep. 25 Salvador Brazil
7 Fort de France Martinique 26 Rio de Janeiro Brazil
8 Tampico Mexico 27 Porto Alegre Brazil
9 Belize City Belize 28 Monte Video Uruguay
10 Puerto Barrios Guatemala 29 Buenos Aires Argentina
11 Puerto Cortes Honduras 30 Bahia Blanca Argentina
12 Limon Costa Rica 31 Comodoro Rivadavia Argentina
13 Panama Panama 32 Puenta Arenas Chile
14 Puntarenas Costa Rica 33 Puerto Montt Chile
15 Corinto Nicaragua 34 Valparaiso Chile
16 Acajutla El Salvador 35 Antofagasta Chile
17 Champerico Guatemala 36 Mollendo Peru
18 Acapulco Mexico 37 Callao Peru
19 Mazatlan Mexico 38 Guayaquil Ecuador
20 Cartagena Colombia 39 Esmeraldes Ecuador
21 Maracaibo Venezuela 40 Buenaventura Colombia



































































Map Number Port Country Map Number Port Country
60 Batumi Georgia 77 Zeebrugge Belgium
61 Odessa Ukraine 78 Antwerp Belgium
62 Constanza Romania 79 Rotterdam Netherlands
63 Varna Bulgaria 80 Hamburg Germany
64 Istanbul Turkey 81 Copenhagen Denmark
65 Piraeus Greece 82 Gdynia Poland
66 Durres Albania 83 Klaipeda Lithuania
67 Split Croatia 84 Oslo Norway
68 Koper Slovenia 85 Stockholm Sweden
69 La Spezia Italy 86 Helsinki Finland
70 Barcelona Spain 87 St. Petersburg Russia
71 Lisbon Portugal 88 Riga Latvia
72 Coruna Spain 89 Tallinn Estonia
73 Bordeaux France 90 Murmansk Russia
74 Le Havre France 91 Arkhangelsk Russia
75 Southampton England 92 Reykjavik Iceland
76 Dublin Ireland
Figure 4-4: Map of Europe showing selected ports
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Far East
Map Number Port Country
113 Vladivostok Russia
114 Yokohama Japan
115 Weonsan North Korea
116 Busan South Korea




121 Hong Kong China
122 Manilla Philippines
123 Ho Chi Minh Vietnam
124 Selat Lombok Indonesia
125 Jakarta Indonesia
126 Singapore Singapore
127 Port Kelang Malaysia
128 Bangkok Thailand
129 Chittagong Bangladesh
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The nautical distances between the two U.S. reference ports and the 133 selected
foreign ports shown above were calculated using information tabulated in "Publication
151 - Distance Between Ports" (referred to hereafter as DBP) prepared by the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA, 2001]. Information on over 1400 worldwide
ports is compiled in this document and all published distances are based on accepted
maritime routes and charted nautical sailing lanes. Because of the impracticality of
listing distances between every possible combination of these ports, distance calculations
using this document typically have to be carried out in several intermediate steps using
specified "junction points". The DBP identifies 25 junction points where international
shipping routes converge and through which ships pass when sailing from one major
maritime area to another (e.g. the Strait of Gibraltar or the Cape of Good Hope).
Distances between any two tabulated world ports can then be calculated by summing the
distances to, and between, these junction points. Some voyage distances vary
considerably depending on whether the Panama Canal can be transited. Because a
significant fraction of the international containership fleet is Post-Panamax, distances
between a given foreign port and the two U.S. reference ports were calculated with and
without access to the Panama Canal. When the two distances differed depending on
canal access, the following expression was used to calculate a weighted average,
Dvg = 0.3Dos_,,anamax + 0.7Dpanaax (2)
where Dpost Panamax is the voyage distance without access to the Panama Canal and
Dpanaa,, is the distance with access. The weighting factors were chosen because 30% of
the current fleet (by capacity) is Post-Panamax and the balance is not. Therefore, a
container heading to the U.S. should have a 0.3 probability of being on a ship that can't
gain access to the Panama Canal and a 0.7 probability of being on a ship that can.
Distances from the 133 foreign ports to New York and Los Angeles in nautical
miles 7 are shown in Table 4-3. The Panamax, Post-Panamax and weighted average
7 1 nautical mile = 1.15 statute miles = 1.85 km
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distances are captured for each foreign port to the 2 U.S. reference ports. Highlighted
cells illustrate the shorter of the voyage distances between the two reference ports.
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4.2.2 Vessel Speed
The diverse fleet of international containerships has a broad spectrum of nominal
cruising speeds. Although point estimates, such as mean values, can be used to convey
information about large and diverse data sets, the character of a wide spectrum of values
is better and more completely captured by a statistical distribution. To develop an
appropriate and representative distribution, a containership database was created using
publicly available Lloyd's Register information provided online by large commercial
shipping lines and U.S. ports. This database was populated with nominal speed (in
knots8) and/or container capacity (in TEU) data for 1,734 commercial container vessels.
Information on both capacity and speed could not be found for every vessel included in
the database so there are 1,184 vessel speed entries and 1,706 vessel capacity entries.
The full database can be found in Appendix A. No size threshold was initially imposed
to exclude any vessel from the database, however, since the subject of interest is
international shipping, some screening criterion had to be devised to bar small domestic
feeder ships from further consideration. In its annual breakdown of commercial shipping
statistics the Maritime Administration (MARAD) of the Department of Transportation
imposes a vessel size threshold of 10,000 deadweight tons9 [MARAD(1), 2004]. This
threshold was adopted as a screening criterion for the containership database to facilitate
fair comparison with the MARAD statistical abstract and was found heuristically to
correspond to vessels with a capacity of roughly 715 TEU. The screened database
contained speed information for 910 vessels and capacity data for 1,313 vessels. For
comparison, MARAD reported that 1,025 containerships called on U.S. ports in 2003.
The speed and capacity information contained in the database were assumed to be
reasonably representative of vessels importing containers to U.S. ports for the following
reasons. All information used to populate the database was available through U.S. ports
or major container shipping lines that service the U.S. Additionally, the size of the data
sets for speed and capacity are comparable to, or exceed, the total number of
8 1 knot = 1 nautical mile/hour = 1.85 km/hour
9 Deadweight tonnage is the amount of cargo, fuels, water, stores, and crew that a vessel can carry when
fully loaded. It is measured in long tons (1 long ton = 2,240 lbs.).
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containerships that called on U.S. ports in all of 2003. However, to obtain some
benchmark of how well the vessel information in the database comported with the
containership fleet that actually serviced U.S. ports in 2003, the mean capacity of
(screened) database vessels was compared to the actual mean capacity reported by
MARAD. The results are shown in Table 4-4 below.
Table 4-4: Vessel database capacity benchmark results
Mean Capacity (TEU)
Database MARAD Error (%)
3047 3144 3.085
Although this benchmark used only a single parameter (because it was the only value that
invited straightforward comparison), the excellent agreement between the database and
the MARAD data suggests that conclusions drawn using the vessel database will be
reasonably representative of the actual containership fleet servicing the U.S.
To extract meaningful statistical information from the 910 nominal vessel speeds
tabulated in the containership database, a cumulative distribution function (CDF) was
constructed. A CDF is a statistical distribution that relates the value of a parameter to the
probability that the given parameter value, or a lesser value, will be observed. In this
case, the CDF gives the probability that a containership calling on a U.S. port will have a
nominal speed equal to or less than any given value.
To construct a CDF, the raw vessel speed data from the screened containership
database was first sorted into ascending order. Then the frequency of each distinct
nominal speed was computed by simply counting how many times a given speed was
observed in the database. The probability, or relative frequency, of each nominal speed




where Pi is the probability of the ith value, and ni is the frequency of the ith value. The




where F[xi] is the discrete CDF value for the ith element. In this case, xi represents each
distinct nominal vessel speed. Figure 4-9 is a plot of the vessel speed CDF with the 25th,
5 0th, 7 5 th, 9 5 th , and 9 9th percentile values identified graphically.
Vessel Speed - Cumulative Distribution Function
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Figure 4-8: Vessel speed CDF
The mean, median, and mode values of the nominal speed from the screened
containership database are shown in Table 4-5 along with interpolated numerical values














The distance and speed analyses performed in the previous sections can now be
used to generate estimated non-stop voyage times for the 133 foreign ports. Weighted
average distances between foreign ports and the U.S. reference ports were used to
calculate voyage times to account for the additional expanse that must be traveled by
Post-Panamax vessels on some routes. Also, acknowledging the inherent variability of
vessel speeds, voyage times were calculated using both the expected, or mean, value of
21.29 knots and the conservative 9 5 th percentile value of 25.77 knots. Voyage times, in
days, were found using the following expression,
D g (5)T =D (5)
voyage 24 * V
where Tvoyage is the voyage time (in days), Davg is the weighted average distance between
the ports of interest (in n.m.) and vx is the mean or 9 5 th percentile vessel speed (in knots).
Table 4-6 shows calculated voyage times, by region.
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Highlighted cells in Table 4-6 illustrate whether the voyage is shorter between the
given foreign port and New York or Los Angeles. The highlighted 9 5th percentile voyage
time represents a conservative lower bound for the amount of count time that will be
available if an attack is mounted from this port. Count times for non-stop voyages from
almost any port in the world to New York or Los Angeles can now be approximated by
interpolating between the tabulated values shown in Table 4-6.
The information above is useful for determining the minimum count time
available for a container shipment being deployed from a particular port or region of the
world. However, it cannot be used directly to give an accurate measure of the expected,
or average, count time that would be available on incoming containerships. This is
because containers are not uniformly imported to the U.S. from all parts of the globe. To
derive a reasonable estimate of how much count time will actually be available on
average, the voyage times from ports that ship more containers to the U.S. must be given
higher relative weightings. The information in Table 4-2 documenting the volume of
container imports broken down by country can be used to assign weighting factors. Since
the 25 countries listed in Table 4-2 make up 86.5% of the total containerized imports to
the United States, using voyage times from ports located in these countries alone should




where Wi is the weighting factor for the ith country in Table 4-2 and nTEUi s the number
of imported containers from the ith country (in TEU). Distances from the countries listed
in Table 4-2 to the U.S. reference ports were obtained using information from the
distance analysis presented above. Each country of interest has at least one port listed in
Table 4-3. For countries with multiple ports listed in Table 4-3, the arithmetic mean of
the port distances from that country was used to establish a single representative distance.
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Voyage times from the countries in Table 4-2 were then calculated using the mean vessel
speed of 21.29 knots (because an expected value was being sought). The appropriate
weighting factors were then applied to the voyage times for each country to find expected
count time values for ships calling on New York and Los Angeles. Results are shown in
Table 4-7.
Table 4-7: Mean voyage times to New York and Los Angeles
Country Imports Weighting New York Los Angeles
(TEU x 1000) Factor Avg. Distance (n.m.) Time [Mean] (days) Avg. Distance (n.m.) Time [Mean] (days)
China 4447 0.36997 11991 23.5 6057 11.9
Hong Kong 1292 0.10749 11981 23.4 6380 12.5
Japan 722 0.06007 11371 22.3 4839 9.5
Taiwan 651 0.05416 11774 23.0 6011 11.8
Italy 473 0.03935 4067 8.0 9643 18.9
Korea 469 0.03902 11771 23.0 5374 10.5
Germany 467 0.03885 3654 7.2 9661 18.9
Brazil 388 0.03228 4413 8.6 7366 14.4
Thailand 378 0.03145 13257 25.9 7775 15.2
Indonesia 261 0.02171 12042 23.6 8392 16.4
India 253 0.02105 11730 23.0 9758 19.1
Malaysia 239 0.01988 12160 23.8 8087 15.8
Netherlands 225 0.01872 3391 6.6 9402 18.4
United Kingdom 206 0.01714 3169 6.2 9181 18.0
France 195 0.01622 3211 6.3 9167 17.9
Costa Rica 166 0.01381 3537 6.9 4243 8.3
Spain 158 0.01314 3314 6.5 9183 18.0
Belgium 156 0.01298 3358 6.6 9365 18.3
Guatemala 156 0.01298 1804 3.5 6546 12.8
Honduras 152 0.01265 1764 3.5 6535 12.8
Philippines 141 0.01173 13543 26.5 6530 12.8
Chile 135 0.01123 6073 11.9 5135 10.0
Turkey 114 0.00948 4997 9.8 10471 20.5
Dominican Republic 98 0.00815 1489 2.9 6290 12.3
Australia 78 0.00649 11321 22.2 7271 14.2
Total 12020 1 Weighted Avg. = 13.3
The mean count times available for vessels calling on New York and Los Angeles are on
the order of 2 weeks. This represents a significant amount of time to make a confident
detection of fissile material. Finally, even though the average count times shown above
were calculated using mean vessel speeds, the assumption that all voyages are non-stop
still makes these numbers reasonably conservative.
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4.3 Vessel Container Capacities
Modem containerships vary considerably in size, with the largest vessels in the
current fleet able to carry over 8,000 TEU [MacGregor, 2003]. The number of detection
units needed to provide adequate coverage of a given vessel will depend on the
dimensions of that particular vessel's container array and the number of commercial
containers being transported. Therefore, to gauge the number of containerized detections
units that will be necessary to implement a comprehensive ship-based detection regime, a
container capacity distribution must be derived for the commercial fleet.
Information from the containership database that was discussed in the vessel
speed section was used to construct a similar CDF for container capacity. The screened
database contained 1,313 capacity entries ranging from 724 TEU to 8,200 TEU. The
CDF development process used for vessel speed was employed again for container
capacity. The general formulae shown in Eqs. (3) and (4) were used, with the frequency
of each distinct container capacity serving as n in Eq. (3) and container capacity (in TEU)
being represented by x in Eq. (4). The resulting capacity CDF is shown in Figure 4-9,
with the 25th, 50th , 75th , 95th , and 9 9 th percentile values illustrated graphically.
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Vessel Capactiy - Cumulative Distribution Function
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Figure 4-9: Vessel capacity CDF
The mean, median, and mode values of the container capacity from the screened
containership database are shown in Table 4-8 along with interpolated numerical values
of the 25th, 75th, 95th, and 9 9 th percentiles.
























The container capacity CDF generated here will be used in subsequent analysis to
develop defensible estimates for the total number of containerized detection units that
will be needed for a fully implemented system.
4.4 Cargo Density
For a ship-based approach to be effective, the signal emitted by concealed fissile
material must be strong enough to be confidently distinguished from natural background
fluctuations by a passive detection unit some distance removed from the source. The
signal will be attenuated by intentional shielding that is likely to be present in the
container bearing the weapon and by the commercial cargo in containers that are oriented
between the source and detector. The maximum amount of intentional shielding is
constrained by the physical dimensions of the container and the 32-ton weight restriction
imposed by international shippers [Lok, 2004]. Although they still allow for a very
substantial amount of intentional shielding, the space and weight constraints do bound the
problem and worst-case signal attenuation can be calculated. What is less
straightforward is the extent to which the intervening commercial cargo will attenuate the
signal.
Density is a cargo parameter that is helpful when trying to accurately model
radiation transport through intervening commercial material. One way to obtain a rough
but useful measure of the density of imported cargo material is to assume that the
contents of a container (and the mass of the contents) are equally distributed throughout
the volume of the container. This "distributed density" (in g/cm3 ) can then be found




where m is the total mass of the cargo, VOlcontainer is the interior volume of the container.
Although the homogeneous distribution of mass throughout the container is clearly
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unphysical, it can be a helpful measure for benchmarking computer simulations. When
simulations are run where representative types of cargo (e.g. furniture, electronics,
clothing, etc.) have been explicitly modeled, it is important to know how the aggregate
distributed density of the modeled cargo compares with the average distributed density of
actual imported cargo (i.e. is the model more, less, or similarly attenuating as actual
cargo). A simple method for obtaining a point estimate of the average distributed density




where mtot is the total tonnage of a large sample of imported containers, nTEU is the
number of imported containers, and VOlTEU is the interior volume of a TEU. Using
imported cargo data for calendar year 2001 (the most recent year for which MARAD
reported total tonnage information) as the large container sample, mtot, nTEU, and VOITEU
are 80,725 metric tons (MT), 11,268 TEU, and 1360 ft2 respectively [MARAD, 2002].
Converting these values into appropriate units and plugging into Eq. (3) gives an average
distributed density of 0.1977 g/cm3 . However, a single point estimate of the average
distributed density is less instructive than a distribution that reflects the relative
probabilities of a range of distributed densities.
The 2001 data for container imports at the top 25 U.S. ports was used construct an
average distributed density CDF. Table 4-9 below shows mtot, nTEu and the calculated
average densities for the top 25 ports [MARAD, 2002].
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Table 4-9: Average distributed density, Pdist, values for imported cargo
Port n TEU m tot
(TEU x 1000) (MT x 1000) Avg Density (glcc)
Los Angeles 2614 16221 0.1712
Long Beach 2376 14355 0.1667
New York 1588 12758 0.2217
Charleston 612 4890 0.2204
Seattle 500 2993 0.1652
Norfolk 454 3556 0.2161
Savannah 431 2998 0.1919
Oakland 419 3058 0.2014
Houston 381 3656 0.2647
Tacoma 356 2111 0.1636
Miami 347 3120 0.2481
Baltimore 178 1942 0.3010
PT Everglades 171 1235 0.1993
San Juan 108 1006 0.2570
Wilmington (DE) 103 965 0.2585
New Orleans 86 891 0.2858
Gulfport 74 599 0.2233
Philadelphia 71 913 0.3548
Boston 51 445 0.2407
Portland 47 350 0.2055
Wilmington (NC) 37 232 0.1730
Chester (PA) 31 316 0.2812
Ponce 30 332 0.3053
W Palm Beach 27 195 0.1993
Jacksonville 25 210 0.2318
All Other 153 1379 0.2487
Total 11268 80725 0.1977
By specifying mtot and nTEu for 26 separate sample populations (i.e. the top 25 ports and
the lumped data for all others) this data can be used to construct an approximate CDF.
The same CDF derivation procedure outlined earlier is used here with the tabulated
values of nTEu serving as the frequency of the given average distributed density value.
The resulting CDF is plotted in Figure 4-10.
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Figure 4-10: Cargo distributed density, Pdist, CDF
Ideally the mass of every individual imported cargo container would be known so that an
exact CDF for Pdist could be derived. In this case, however, the data points used to
construct the CDF were themselves already point estimates of larger data sets. Although
some useful information about the character of the original data is lost when a single
point estimate is used to represent a population of data, these point estimates encapsulate
the most important aggregated attributes of the original data. Therefore, even though it is
based on aggregated point estimates instead of exhaustive raw data, the approximate
average distributed density CDF is still a useful measure of the probability that the





Chapter 5: Deployment Simulation
5.1 Introduction
The fact that the proposed ship-based approach would deploy containerized
detection units aboard commercial containerships has been discussed, but the manner in
which these units would be deployed (i.e. how they are loaded onto the ship and
distributed throughout the vessel's container array) has not been addressed. Ideally, the
detection units could be loaded in a manner that simultaneously allowed completely
clandestine deployment and maximum detection coverage with the minimum number of
units. If this could be accomplished, total system costs would be minimized and
adversaries would be kept utterly unaware of the number and location of deployed
detection units that could interrupt or thwart their efforts. In reality, however, there is a
trade-off between the precision with which one can dictate or predict the placement of the
detection units and the covert nature of the deployment process. Specifying exactly
where or how certain cargo containers are to be loaded into the container array can
optimize the amount of the containership covered per detection unit, but it could also
provide enemies with valuable information about the defensive measures being employed
against them. This fundamental trade-off leads to a potential clash between coverage
efficiency and stealth.
A computer-based deployment simulator was created using Matlab to help inform
the process of striking an appropriate balance between coverage efficiency and stealth.
This simulator was used to quantify the coverage efficiency gains that could be reaped by
adopting increasingly constrained (and consequently less stealthy) deployment strategies.
Three strategies were investigated, including a random deployment where units could be
placed anywhere in the container array, a partially constrained deployment where units
were randomly placed anywhere except a specified exclusion zone one container deep
around the surface of the array, and a fully constrained deployment where units could
only be placed along a row down the length of the array. Hereafter, these strategies are
referred to as random, constrained, and centerline deployment, respectively.
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An extremely important remaining uncertainty (that is outside the scope of this
thesis) is the effective detection range of a deployed unit. The effective range is the
maximum distance at which a unit is expected to reliably detect the presence of fissile
material when deployed amongst commercial containers with realistic and representative
cargo. Once a reasonable estimate for the effective range is obtained, it is a
straightforward problem to determine the expected detection coverage provided by
centerline deployment. The relative ease of calculating centerline coverage stems from
the highly constrained nature of this deployment strategy, which uniquely determines the
spatial distribution of detection units for any given container array. The spatial
distributions arising from the other two strategies, however, are determined either totally
or partially by chance. Mean attributes, such as expected detection coverage, of systems
with this stochastic character are often difficult or impossible to derive analytically and
instead lend themselves to Monte Carlo analysis.
Monte Carlo techniques use random numbers to sample distributions for
parameters to be used in a calculation, or calculations, of interest. The calculation is then
carried out a large number of times with each iteration using different randomly sampled
parameter values. The large population of outputs from the calculation of interest can
then be statically analyzed to gain meaningful insights. The speed with which modem
digital computers can carry out large numbers of computations makes Monte Carlo
analysis a very powerful tool for solving complex problems.
Detection coverage calculations for container arrays of arbitrary sizes were
carried out using Monte Carlo methods for both random and constrained deployment.
Random numbers were used to sample the uniform distributions representing Cartesian
coordinates that determined the placement location of a given detection unit within the
container array. Once a given number of detection units with a specified detection range
were randomly distributed throughout a container array with known dimensions, the
detection coverage calculation could be carried out for this geometry. The output was
then logged and the entire detector placement and coverage calculation process was
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carried out again until the output population was large enough to yield good statistics.
Expected values, along with corresponding standard deviations, for random and
constrained deployment could then be determined through statistical analysis.
5.2 Model Development
The deployment simulator was programmed in Matlab and takes advantage of the
ease with which the Matlab environment can create and manipulate n-dimensional
matrices. The entire container array of a hypothetical vessel is modeled in matrix space
with each cubic foot of actual volume represented by an individual element in a 3-
dimensional matrix. Detection units are then distributed through the container array in a
manner consistent with the constraints of the scenario (i.e. random, constrained, or
centerline) being studied. With the geometry of the problem now uniquely specified, the
fractional volume of the actual container array that would be effectively covered by the
detectors in the generated configuration can be calculated using a few simple matrix
operations in Matlab. If Monte Carlo analysis were being used, as would be the case for
random and constrained deployment, this process of detector placement and fractional
coverage calculation would be repeated many times.
5.2.1 Assumptions
Key assumptions will be identified, and explained before a detailed treatment of
the simulator's algorithm and mechanics is offered. First, it was assumed that all
container arrays were continuous rectangular prisms. This is an approximation given that
large vessels often have container arrays that taper below deck (to accommodate hull
dimensions) and some discontinuity created by the ship's superstructure. These effects
were not explicitly modeled because the degree of tapering and the location and
magnitude of superstructure discontinuities vary depending on the size and design of the
containership and cannot be meaningfully generalized.
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Since the detection suite is not necessarily confined to the center of a
containerized unit, it was also assumed that detectors could be centered at any (non-
constrained) location in the container array and not limited solely to coordinates that
corresponded to the midpoints of containers. This assumption simplifies calculation but
was made primarily to conserve computation time. It was noted that this assumption
could lead to the non-physical situation of two or more detectors being randomly
assigned to the volume corresponding to a single container. The probability of any two
detectors being randomly assigned to the same (TEU) °0 container volume is represented
by the following expression,
p = 1 fnl (xyz-i) = (xyz- 1)! (9
(xyz)( i- xyz - ' (xyz - n)!
where x, y, and z are the number of unconstrained TEUs arrayed in the respective x, y,
and z directions and n is the number of detectors being deployed. In general, the
probability of 2 detectors being assigned to the same container volume increases as n
increases and as the total number of TEUs (i.e. [xyz]) decreases. The effects of this
"double-assignment" will be examined in more detail in subsequent sections.
Another important assumption is that deployed units provide coverage of a
perfectly spherical volume with a radius determined by the effective detection range.
(Estimates for the effective detection range are being developed by Gallagher at MIT and
are still evolving as design decisions and improvements are made, so a series of range
values were assumed as part of a parameter study). This is an approximation of a real-
world setting, where shielding effects manifested by the specific loading and cargo
characteristics of surrounding commercial containers and the threat container itself would
render the effective detection volume non-spherical. It is further assumed that fissile
material located anywhere within the idealized coverage sphere will be detected with
equal probability. In reality, a source close to the detector will be more easily detected
'0 The probability that any two detectors will be assigned to the same 40' container can also be found using
Eq. (9) by substituting (xyz/2) for each (xyz) term.
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than one at the outer edge of the sphere (along the same line of sight) as a result of
shielding by intervening materials and the inverse square nature of detector solid angles.
This assumption was deemed acceptable because the definition of the effective detection
range is the expected maximum distance at which a source can be confidently and
reliably detected with a given count time under realistic conditions. Also, by not
considering or crediting the enhanced ease of detection afforded by source proximity and
detection sphere overlap, the analysis gains a measure of conservatism.
5.2.2 Input/Output
The Matlab-based deployment simulator accepted user-defined inputs for
container array dimensions (length, width, and height in TEUs), the number of detectors
to be distributed through the array, the effective detection range (in ft.) and the number of
runs to be completed for Monte Carlo analysis. Output for Monte Carlo calculations
were statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values) that
described the set of fractional detection coverages calculated for each run, or iteration, of
the simulation. Output for the deterministic centerline analysis consisted of a fractional
detection coverage corresponding to the evaluated scenario.
5.2.3 Algorithm
The simulation of each deployment strategy (i.e. random, constrained, and
centerline) used the same algorithm to generate a virtual container array and then
calculate the fractional volume that was "covered" by deployed detectors. Differences in
random, constrained, and centerline deployment simulation were limited primarily to the
manner in which the detectors were placed into (or distributed through) the virtual array.
For clarity, the algorithm will be explained in its entirety using random deployment as an
example. Differences in the detector placement step for constrained and centerline
deployment will then be identified and discussed. The actual Matlab codes used to
simulate each type of deployment are found in Appendix B.
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The simulation began by creating a matrix representation of the physical space to
be modeled by employing user inputs that defined the desired container array dimensions.
The inputs specify array dimensions in terms of how many (TEU) containers are to be
aligned along the length, width, and height of the array. Figure 5-1 shows the assumed






Figure 5-1: Container orientation for simulation
A 3-dimensional matrix was then constructed in which each cubic foot of physical space
in the user-specified container array was represented by a matrix element with an initial
value of 0. This "geometry matrix" had dimensions [(x*8),(y*8),(z*20)], where x, y, and
z were the user inputs for the number of containers along the respective height, width,
and length of the array and the scaler multipliers are the corresponding height, width, and
length dimensions of (TEU) containers in feet.
Detector placement was the next step in simulation. For random deployment,
Matlab's random number generator was used to assign arbitrary coordinates (referred to
here as dx, dy, and dz) to fix the center-point of an emplaced detector. Once dx, dy, and
dz had been identified, a new null matrix, referred to hereafter as the "detector matrix",
was created. The detector matrix was of the same dimensions as the geometry matrix and








Next the coverage sphere associated with the emplaced detector was generated.
An approximated sphere can be created within a 3-dimensional matrix by serially
evaluating individual elements to determine the linear distance between the given
element and the emplaced detector using the following expression,
D= (i dx)2 + (j -dy)2 + (k -dz)2 (10)
where i,j, and k are the respective x, y, and z coordinates of the matrix element being
evaluated. If this distance is greater than the effective detection radius, R, then the
element under evaluation is outside the detection sphere and the value of that element
remains 0. If the distance is less than or equal to R, the element in question is within the
detection sphere and its value in the detector matrix is changed to 1. To save
computation time, only matrix elements inside a cube centered at (dx, dy, dz) with sides
measuring 2R were evaluated using Eq. (10). This cube bounding the detection sphere is
shown (2-dimensionally) in Figure 5-2.
2R
I 2R(dx4yjdz) 2R
Figure 5-2: Cube bounding the detection sphere
Once the entire coverage sphere, represented by elements with a value of 1, had
been generated, an element-by-element comparison of the detector matrix and the
geometry matrix was performed using the logical OR operator, whose properties are
shown in Table 5-1.
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Table 5-1: Properties of the OR operator





The matrix resulting from this operation becomes the updated geometry matrix. The
process of detector placement is then repeated and a new detector matrix is created. The
new detector matrix is then compared to the updated geometry matrix, again using the
logical OR operator, and the result becomes the new geometry matrix. Each time the
geometry matrix is updated, the OR operation imprints it with another coverage sphere.
The OR operator is used in lieu of matrix addition to avoid overlapping coverage regions
being double counted in the final fractional coverage calculation.
The process of emplacing detectors, creating detector matrices, and updating the
geometry matrix continues until the user specified number of detectors has been
deployed. At this point, the geometry matrix holds the placement and coverage
information of every detector, in addition to information defining the overall dimensions
of the simulated container array. An element of the geometry matrix with a value of 1
represents physical space that is within the effective detection range of an emplaced
detector, and is therefore "covered". Matlab can then sum the values of all the elements
in the geometry matrix to find the volume covered by deployed detectors. The coverage
volume, represented by the summation of the geometry matrix, can then be divided by the
total number of elements in the geometry matrix, which represents the total volume of the
simulated container array, to find the fractional coverage volume. The fractional




where F is the fractional coverage volume, Vcov is the volume of the array that is
"covered" by deployed detectors, and Vtotal is the total volume of the array.
This entire process is repeated until the user-defined number of fractional
coverage volume outputs has been generated. At the end of each run, the calculated
fractional coverage value is added to an output vector. Once the vector has been fully
populated, Matlab performs statistical analysis on the output data and returns the mean,
median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the fractional coverage.
Detector placement for constrained and centerline deployment is the only major
difference from the simulation process described above. Matlab's random number
generator is also used to determine coordinates for detector placement in constrained
deployment simulations. However, before a detector matrix is generated reflecting a
given placement location, the coordinates are checked to ensure that the detector is not
being placed in physical space that would be in a container that is along the surface of the
array (i.e. the first or last [TEU] container in any row, column, or span of the array). If
the prospective placement coordinates fall in this exclusion zone, then they are discarded
and new sets of random numbers are generated until coordinates are obtained that satisfy
the constraints. When coordinates are found that do not place the detector in the
exclusion zone, a detector matrix is generated and the element representing the placement
coordinates is given a value of 1. For deterministic centerline deployment calculations,
detector placement is determined by the user inputs concerning the geometry of the
container array and the number of detectors to be deployed.
5.2.4 Validation and Verification
During development, a 2-dimensional version of the each simulation code was
created to facilitate validation and debugging. Once the 2-dimensional models were
found to work as expected with high confidence, they were scaled up to the full 3-
dimensional simulations of interest. Prior to actual data collection, the output from 3-
dimensional test simulations, starting with small scale runs (i.e. modestly sized arrays
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with a small number of deployed detectors) and concluding with a limited number of
larger scale runs, were extensively checked against hand calculations.
This validation and verification process also sought to ensure that reality was
being modeled with reasonable accuracy. One problem with representing physical space,
and especially spherical regions of space, with elements of 3-dimensional matrices is the
discretization error introduced by the non-continuous nature of matrix space. To provide
reasonably high fidelity models of coverage spheres, each matrix element represented 1
cubic foot. For reference, at this resolution, it takes 2720 matrix elements to model the
interior of one full sized 40' cargo container. To check the error introduced by
discretization, the calculated volume values for spheres generated in matrix space were
compared to the theoretical volume (in ft3) given by the following formula,
4 (12)V = -'r
3
where r is the radius of the sphere (in ft). Table 5-2 shows the discretization error
observed for spheres of varying radii.
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Table 5-2: Spherical volume error
Radius (ft) Simulation (ftA3) Theoretical (ftA3) Error (%)
45 381615 381703.5 0.0232
50 523305 523598.8 0.0561
55 696507 696910 0.0578
60 904089 904778.7 0.0762
65 1149651 1150346.5 0.0605
70 1436385 1436755 0.0258
75 1767063 1767145.9 0.0047
80 2143641 2144660.6 0.0475
85 2571711 2572440.8 0.0284
The errors tabulated above are quite small, so the volume underestimation caused by the
discrete nature of matrix space will not significantly impact the accuracy of the fractional
coverage values output by the simulations.
5.3 Random Deployment
A deployment methodology where containerized detection units are randomly
loaded onto containerships is vastly preferable in terms of both logistics and stealth. By
imposing no constraints on the placement of these units, there is no opportunity for an
adversary to identify their presence due to abnormal or preferential treatment during the
loading process. Therefore, the enemy is not afforded an opportunity to study and probe
the defense posture prior to attack or the opportunity to take compensatory action during
an attack. The logistics of random deployment are also favorable in that the detection
units can be simply delivered to the embarkation port or commercial shipper and then
monitored from afar without the need for further direct involvement.
Despite these important advantages, randomly placed detection units can lead to
highly inefficient container array geometries due to spatial clustering of units or
deployment on or near the fringes of the array. Due to the possibility of poor container
array geometries, additional units must be deployed to ensure that an adequate level of
detection coverage will be provided. Simulation was carried out in an attempt to better
quantify the effects of placement randomization on coverage efficiency (i.e. the fractional
coverage provided by a given number of detection units) and to estimate the number of
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units that would be required for different levels of coverage for containerships of a given
size.
The simulation explained in Section 5.2.3 calls for the specification of container
array dimensions, effective detection range, number of deployed detectors, and number of
runs as inputs. Five standard container array geometries were selected for use throughout
this analysis to facilitate comparison between the deployment strategies. The dimensions
of these "reference arrays" are shown in Table 5-3.
Table 5-3: Reference array dimensions
Reference Array Dimensions Capacity
Height (cont) Width (cont) Length (cont) (TEU)
8 9 20 1440
8 12 26 2496
10 12 30 3600
10 15 32 4800
10 17 38 6460
Reference arrays shown above were selected to provide a representative sample of the
capacities and array geometries of the contemporary containership fleet.
Gallagher at MIT is currently investigating the effective detection range.
Preliminary analysis and modeling suggests that the range may be somewhere around 65
ft. Using this uncertain estimate as a point of departure, detection ranges spanning from
45 ft. to 85 ft. (in 5 ft. increments) were studied.
To determine the appropriate number of iterations to obtain high confidence
results with good statistics, a sample simulation was run using 1, 5, 10, 50, 100, 200, 500
and 1000 iterations. Results of the test, which used 15 detectors with 65 ft. ranges
randomly deployed within the 4800 TEU reference array, are shown in Table 5-4.
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Table 5-4: Mean fractional coverage results for variable run sizes
Runs 1 5 10 50 100 200 500 1000
Mean 0.7133 0.7308 0.7750 0.7577 0.7522 0.7523 0.7566 0.7553
Std Dev 0 0.0646 0.0922 0.0673 0.0566 0.0584 0.0583 0.0587
Table 5-4 shows that the mean fractional coverage begins to converge at around 50
iterations and the standard deviation has been reduced to the extent practicable by the
100th run. These results are similar to those obtained for cases using different test
parameters. As a result, 200 was chosen to be the standard number of iterations used in
the simulation of each scenario. This number of runs was large enough to provide high
confidence results with good statistics, but small enough to make efficient use of limited
computational resources.
Simulations were carried out as follows. Starting with the smallest reference
array, the shortest effective detection range was held fixed and the number of deployed
units was varied until a distribution of outputs with mean fractional detection coverage
values having a nominal span of at least 0.75 to 0.95 was obtained. Then 5 ft. was added
to the effective detection range input and the process was carried out again. Once this
had been completed for each 5 ft. increment of effective detection range from 45 ft to 85
ft. the next reference array was selected and the entire process began anew. Inputs and
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To distill the information captured in Table 5-5 for easier inspection and analysis, Figures
5-2 through 5-6 show plots that relate the mean values of fractional coverage volume, as
defined in Eq. (1 1), to the number of deployed detectors for each reference array.
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Figure 5-4: Coverage vs. Detectors plot for the 2496 TEU array [Random]
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Figure 5-6: Coverage vs. Detectors plot for the 4800 TEU array [Random]
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It is unclear what minimum acceptable level of detection coverage is appropriate,
given the reality that it will not always be possible to provide 100% coverage of every
containership and that attempting to do so will likely prove to be cost prohibitive.
Acknowledging this uncertainty, all subsequent analysis will measure the system against
three potential choices for minimum acceptable coverage. These three levels are 75%,
85%, and 95%.
To identify the number of detectors with a given range that are required to
provide 75%, 85%, and 95% coverage for each of the 5 reference arrays, the mean
fractional coverages for each simulated scenario were plotted and graphical techniques
were employed. Figure 5-7 shows an example using the 1440 TEU reference array and
detectors with a 65 ft. effective range (error bars represent +/- 1 standard deviation).
Figure 5-8: Graphical determination of detectors required for various coverage levels
For the example case illustrated in Figure 5-7, it was estimated that 75%, 85%, and 95%
fractional detection coverage could be provided with 6, 8, and 14 detectors, respectively.
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Results of these graphical analyses showing the estimated number of detectors needed to
provide various levels of coverage for each scenario are listed in Table 5-6.
Table 5-6: Estimated number of detectors needed for various scenarios [Random]
One clear trend observed in the Figures above (particularly 5-2 through 5-6) are
the diminishing returns in coverage afforded by the deployment of each additional
detector, especially in the high coverage region (i.e. above around 0.80). It takes the
addition of considerably more detectors to get from 85% to 95% coverage than it took to
get from 75% to 85%. Using the scenario where detectors with a 65 ft. range were
deployed in the 6460 TEU reference array as an example, it took 7 additional detectors to
go from 75% to 85% coverage and 18 additional detectors to go from 85% to 95%.
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Reference Array Capacity (TEU)Random Deployment
Range (ft) Coverage 1440 2496 3600 4800 6460Range (ft) Coverage
0.75 13 21 30 37 59
45 0.85 19 31 40 52 68
0.95 32 50 69 88 117
0.75 11 17 22 29 37
50 0.85 15 23 31 40 52
0.95 25 39 53 69 88
0.75 9 13 18 23 30
55 0.85 12 19 25 31 41
0.95 19 30 41 53 70
0.75 7 11 15 18 24
60 0.85 10 15 20 26 33
0.95 15 25 34 43 55
0.75 6 9 12 15 20
65 0.85 8 12 17 20 27
0.95 14 21 27 34 45
0.75 5 8 10 13 16
70 0.85 7 11 14 18 22
0.95 11 18 23 29 38
0.75 5 7 9 11 14
75 0.85 6 9 12 15 18
0.95 10 15 19 24 31
0.75 4 6 8 9 12
80 0.85 6 8 10 13 17
0.95 9 14 17 21 29
0.75 4 5 7 8 10
85 0.85 5 8 9 11 15
0.95 8 12 15 19 25
The primary cause of this phenomenon is the fact that random deployment does
not promise uniform distribution of detectors throughout a container array. As a result,
randomized placement will unavoidably give rise to some well-covered regions with
significant coverage overlap and some sparsely covered regions with little to no detection
coverage. Detectors cannot be preferentially deployed to uncovered or inadequately
covered areas. Therefore, to enhance the fractional coverage area with additional
detectors, one must rely on the capricious nature of random placement to fortuitously
deploy added units to sparsely covered regions. Inefficiencies associated with this
process lead to the diminishing marginal returns observed in the simulation results. The
extent to which random deployment is less efficient than optimal centerline deployment
will be discussed in a later section.
Although the mechanism discussed above is the primary determinant, there is
another factor at work in the deployment simulation that artificially magnifies the
diminishing returns effect. Given that the simulation used for this analysis assumed that
the center point of detectors could be placed at any point in space within the container
array, there is a non-negligible probability, given by Eq. (9), that 2 detectors could be
randomly assigned to the space that corresponds to a single container. The probability of
this "double assignment" increases as the number of deployed detectors increases. Since
double assignment is an inefficient distribution of detectors, it could make a small
contribution to the diminishing returns effect. Table 5-7 shows the probability that any 2
detectors will be randomly assigned to the same 20' and 40' container volumes for a
sampling of simulated scenarios.
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Table 5-7: Double assignment probabilities for 20' and 40' containers [Random]
Capacity Detectors Double Assign. Double Assign. Capacity Detectors Double Assign. Double Assign.
1440 3 0.002 0.004 3600 60 0.390 0.630
1440 5 0.007 0.014 3600 70 0.491 0.743
1440 10 0.031 0.061 4800 5 0.002 0.004
1440 15 0.071 0.137 4800 10 0.009 0.019
1440 20 0.124 0.234 4800 20 0.039 0.076
1440 25 0.189 0.344 4800 30 0.087 0.166
1440 30 0.262 0.458 4800 40 0.150 0.279
1440 35 0.341 0.568 4800 50 0.226 0.402
2496 3 0.001 0.002 4800 60 0.310 0.525
2496 5 0.004 0.008 4800 70 0.397 0.638
2496 10 0.018 0.036 4800 80 0.484 0.736
2496 15 0.041 0.081 4800 90 0.568 0.816
2496 20 0.074 0.142 6460 5 0.002 0.003
2496 25 0.114 0.215 6460 10 0.007 0.014
2496 30 0.161 0.296 6460 20 0.029 0.057
2496 39 0.258 0.451 6460 30 0.065 0.126
2496 47 0.353 0.584 6460 40 0.114 0.215
2496 52 0.414 0.660 6460 50 0.173 0.317
3600 3 0.001 0.002 6460 60 0.240 0.424
3600 5 0.003 0.006 6460 70 0.313 0.529
3600 10 0.012 0.025 6460 80 0.388 0.627
3600 20 0.052 0.101 6460 90 0.464 0.714
3600 30 0.114 0.216 6460 100 0.537 0.787
3600 40 0.195 0.354 6460 110 0.607 0.847
3600 50 0.290 0.497 6460 120 0.671 0.893
Table 5-7 shows the probability that any two detectors will be assigned to a single
container becomes quite large as the number of deployed detectors gets large and in some
extreme cases, double assignment is almost assured. Since this inefficient double
assignment is non-physical, the fractional detection coverage output by the simulation
will be marginally underestimated and the diminishing returns effect will be slightly
exaggerated.
Another notable feature of the results captured in Table 5-6 is the strong relation
between the number of detectors needed to provide a given fractional coverage level and
the effective detection range of the deployed units. This dependence is illustrated in
Figures 5-8 through 5-12 where the estimated number of detectors required for 75%,










50 60 70 80
Range (ft)
Figure 5-9: Required Detectors vs. Range for the 1440 TEU array [Random]
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Figure 5-11: Required Detectors vs. Range for the 3600 TEU array [Random]
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Figure 5-12: Required Detectors vs. Range for the 4800 TEU array [Random]
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Figure 5-13: Required Detectors vs. Range for the 6460 TEU array [Random]
The pronounced "range effect" illustrated in Figures 5-8 through 5-12 can be
explained by the relation between the effective detection range and the volume of
coverage provided by a detection unit. Equation (12) shows that the volume of the
idealized detection sphere increases as the cube of the effective detection radius.
Therefore, the volume of a detection sphere created by a detector with an 85 ft. radius is
6.74 times greater than that of a detector with a 45 ft. radius. By covering a significantly
larger detection volume per unit, fewer long-range detectors are needed, on average, to
provide a given fractional coverage.
Finally, although the 6460 TEU reference array represents a larger container
capacity than the 95th percentile vessel in the current fleet, it is likely that the trend to
build and deploy larger and larger containerships will continue in the coming years until
capacities exceed 10000 TEU [Ircha, 2002]. Figures 5-13 through 5-17 plot the number
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Figure 5-14: Required Detectors (with 45 ft. range) vs. Array Capacity [Random]
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Figure 5-16: Required Detectors (with 65 ft. range) vs. Array Capacity [Random]
Detectors vs. Capacity (Range = 75 ft)
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Detectors vs. Capacity (Range = 85 ft)
Figure 5-18: Required Detectors (with 85 ft. range) vs. Array Capacity [Random]
Figures 5-13 through 5-17 show relationships between the number of required
detectors and vessel container capacities that are linear to a very good approximation.
This linearity could be used in the future to estimate the number of detectors needed to
provide coverage of proposed vessels with capacities exceeding those of containerships
in the fleet today.
5.4 Constrained Deployment
Deviation from random deployment could challenge and potentially comprise the
desired surreptitious nature of the ship-based approach and invite serious logistical
difficulties. However, given the coverage inefficiencies that are an unavoidable
consequence of completely random deployment, the constrained deployment strategy was
investigated to determine the efficiency gains that could be reaped by imposing minimum
loading constraints. In an effort to limit the undesirable and inefficient situation in which












0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Capacity (TEU)
deployment simulation explicitly barred the assignment of detectors to space that
corresponded to the first or last (TEU) container in any row, column, or span of the array.
It is unclear whether even this limited constraint would be possible to impose in practice.
Constrained deployment simulation was carried out in the same manner as
described above for random deployment. The only modification to the simulation
schedule was the exclusion of scenarios with detectors having 45 ft. and 85 ft. effective
ranges. Limited computing resources necessitated the tailoring of the simulation
schedule and the excised scenarios were the most computationally intensive1 . Table 5-8
shows the output statistics for constrained simulations.
" 45 ft. range scenarios were intensive due to the large number of detectors that had to be deployed to
achieve desired fractional coverages. 85 ft. range scenarios were intensive because of the large number of
computations required to construct their detection spheres.
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For ease of inspection, the mean fractional coverage volumes for each scenario and
reference array are plotted in Figures 5-18 through 5-22.
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Figure 5-20:
Number of Detectors
Coverage vs. Detectors plot for the 2496 TEU array [Constrained]
Coverage vs. Detectors (3600 TEU)
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Figure 5-22: Coverage vs. Detectors plot for the 4800 TEU array [Constrained]
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Figure 5-23: Coverage vs. Detectors plot for the 6460 TEU array [Constrained]
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The number of detectors needed to provide 75%, 85%, and 95% coverage for
each scenario were estimated in the same manner as described in the previous section and
results are shown in Table 5-9.
Table 5-9: Estimated number of detectors needed for various scenarios [Constrained]
Constrained Capacity (TEU)
Depl ent 1440 2496 3600 4800 6460Range (ft) Coverage
0.75 9 14 20 25 33
50 0.85 12 20 28 35 48
0.95 21 38 51 65 86
0.75 7 12 16 20 26
55 0.85 10 16 21 28 37
0.95 18 28 39 50 65
0.75 6 9 12 15 21
60 0.85 8 13 18 23 29
0.95 15 23 31 40 51
0.75 5 8 11 13 18
65 0.85 7 11 15 18 24
0.95 11 19 25 32 43
0.75 5 8 9 11 15
70 0.85 7 10 12 16 20
0.95 11 16 20 28 36
0.75 4 7 8 10 15
75 0.85 6 9 11 13 20
0.95 9 14 18 23 35
0.75 4 6 7 9 11
80 0.85 5 8 10 11 15
0.95 9 13 15 20 26
When the numbers tabulated above for constrained deployment are compared to
the random deployment results shown in Table 5-7, the differences are not particularly
striking. Surprisingly, very little is gained in terms of coverage efficiency by
constraining placement in containers along the surface of the array. It appears, that by
excluding placement in such a large volume fraction of the total container array, that
inefficient overlapping was promoted in the center. This seems to have offset efficiency
gains that were realized by limiting coverage volume "losses" at the surface of the array.
Double assignment effects also played a larger role in the constrained simulation because
the (xyz) term in Eq. (9) was smaller due to the imposed placement constraint.
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5.5 Centerline Deployment
Centerline deployment, where detectors are optimally distributed along the length
of the middle row and column of the container array, is the least secure of the examined
deployment strategies, in terms of concealing the location of detection units. It is also
dubious as to whether this approach would be logistically feasible in practice. However,
the completely constrained nature of this strategy does afford extremely efficient
utilization of detector coverage. As a result, this deployment approach is useful for
establishing a lower bound for the number of detectors that would be needed to cover a
vessel with a given capacity. This lower bound can also be used to quantify the coverage
efficiency losses resulting from full randomization.
Since the imposed constraints dictate that detectors could only be placed along the
centerline of the reference arrays, the geometry of each scenario was uniquely specified
so only one calculation (as opposed to multi-run Monte Carlo analysis) was needed to
determine the coverage. For the purposes of these calculations, the centerline of each
array was assumed to consist of 40' containers to more accurately model arrays
encountered aboard actual containerships. It was further assumed that detectors were
only placed in the center of these full-sized containers. The first scenario for each
reference array would place a detector in each of the available full containers along the
centerline. The next scenario would place detectors in every other container, then every
third container, and so on. Sometimes using placement patterns of this fashion did not
uniquely specify the arrangement of detectors. For example, if detectors are to be placed
in every third full sized container and there are 15 containers along the length of the
centerline, then the desired placement pattern can be realized with an equal number of
detectors when the pattern is begun with a detector in the first, second, or third container
in the line. Whenever there were degrees of freedom associated with which container to
place the first detector in, the coverage for each available geometry was calculated and
the arrangement with the highest coverage was used. The results of these calculations
are shown in Table 5-10.
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For ease of inspection, the fractional coverage volumes provided by selected detector
loading patterns 1 2 in each reference array are plotted in Figures 5-23 through 5-27.
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Number of Centerline Deployed Detectors
Figure 5-24: Coverage vs. Detectors plot for the 1440 TEU array [Centerline]
12 When two or more loading patterns resulted in the same number of detectors being deployed, only the
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Figure 5-25: Coverage vs. Detectors plot for the 2496 TEU array [Centerline]
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Figure 5-27: Coverage vs. Detectors plot for the 4800 TEU array [Centerline]
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The number of centerline deployed detectors needed to provide 75%, 85%, and
95% coverage for each evaluated range and reference array are shown in Table 5-11.
Table 5-11: Estimated number of detectors needed for various scenarios [Centerline]
Centerline Reference Array Capacity (TEU)
Depi oment 1440 2496 3600 4800 6460Range (ft) Coverage
0.75 5 10 N/A N/A N/A
45 0.85 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.95 10 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.75 5 6 8 N/A N/A
50 0.85 5 9 13 N/A N/A
0.95 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.75 4 6 7 12 N/A
55 0.85 5 6 8 N/A N/A
0.95 5 10 N/A N/A N/A
0.75 4 5 5 7 12
60 0.85 4 6 6 12 N/A
0.95 5 7 9 N/A N/A
0.75 3 5 5 6 8
65 0.85 4 5 5 7 15
0.95 4 6 7 14 N/A
0.75 3 4 4 4 7
70 0.85 4 5 5 6 8
0.95 4 5 6 8 19
0.75 3 4 4 4 6
75 0.85 3 5 4 5 7
0.95 4 5 5 7 9
0.75 2 3 4 4 5
80 0.85 3 4 4 5 6
0.95 3 5 5 7 8
0.75 2 3 3 4 5
85 0.85 3 4 4 4 5
0.95 3 4 4 5 6
Depending on the effective range of the detection unit, there are some levels of
coverage for certain reference arrays that cannot be achieved through the use of detectors
deployed exclusively along the centerline (denoted in Table 5-11 as N/A). However, in
cases where the range is sufficient to provide desirable coverage using only centerline
deployment, the deployment efficiency resulting from the preferential placement
attendant to this approach allows high levels of coverage to be achieved with a significant
economy of detection units.
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5.6 Deployment Comparison
The most germane comparison that can be drawn between the deployment
strategies examined in the previous sections is to contrast the number of detectors
required by each method to achieve given levels of fractional coverage when faced with
identical range and array capacity scenarios. Since constrained deployment was not
found to hold any significant efficiency advantages over random deployment (despite its
stealth and logistical disadvantages), only random and centerline deployment will be
considered in the following analysis.
Table 5-12 shows the number of detectors required for each scenario using both
random and centerline deployment. It also tabulates the ratio of randomly deployed
detectors to centerline deployed detectors for each case so that a measure of the
efficiency cost of randomization can be obtained.
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Table 5-12: Random vs. Centerline deployment comparison
Random vs. Reference Array Capac (TEU
Centerline 1440 2496 3600 4800 6460
Ranae ftl Coveraae R C IR/C R C IR/C R C IR/C R C IRIC C I R 
I . 0.75 -- '113 5D- 2 ,-I -0.75 13 5 2.6 21 10 2.1 30
45 0.85 19 7 2.7 31
0.95 32 10 3.2 50






9I IIIf - I - / n I Z ^Iv. , .v .v v .v v .v &.v
50 0.85 15 5 3.0 23 9 2.6 31 13 2.4 40
0.95 25 7 3.6 39 53 ' 69
7 Ia A 4 'I n '1 14 7 OR N
55 0.85 12 5 2.4 19 6 3.2 25 8 3.1 31
0.95 19 5 3.8 30 10 3.0 41 : . 53












60 0.85 10 4 2.5 15 6 2.5 20 6 3.3 26 12 22 33
0.95 15 5 3.0 25 7 3.6 34 9 3.8 43 55
0.75 6 3 2.0 9 5 1.8 12 5 2.4 15 6 2.5 20
65 0.85 8 4 2.012 2.417 5 3.4 20 7 2.9 27 15 1.8
0.95 14 4 3.5 21 6 3.5 27 7 3.9 34 14 2.4 45
0.75 5 3 1.7 8 4 2.0 10 4 2.5 13 4 3.3 16 7 2.3
70 0.85 7 4 1.8 11 5 2.2 14 5 2.8 18 6 3.0 22 8 2.8
0.95 11 4 2.8 18 5 3.6 23 6 3.8 29 8 3.6 38 19 2.0
0.75 5 3 1.7 7 4 1.8 9 4 2.3 11 4 2.8 14 6 2.3
75 0.85 6 3 2.0 9 5 1.8 12 4 3.0 15 5 3.0 18 7 2.6
0.95 10 4 2.5 15 5 3.0 19 5 3.8 24 7 3.4 31 9 3.4
0.75 4 2 2.0 6 3 2.0 8 4 2.0 9 4 2.3 12 5 2.4
80 0.85 6 3 2.0 8 4 2.0 10 4 2.5 13 5 2.6 17 6 2.8
0.95 9 3 3.0 14 5 2.8 17 5 3.4 21 7 3.0 29 8 3.6
0.75 4 2 2.0 5 3 1.7 7 3 2.3 8 4 2.0 10 5 2.0
85 0.85 5 3 1.7 8 4 2.0 9 4 2.3 11 4 2.8 15 5 3.0
0.95 8 3 2.7 12 4 3.0 15 4 3.8 19 5 3.8 25 6 4.2
Comparisons between random and centerline deployment could be rendered moot
if the centerline strategy is definitively judged to be logistically infeasible or if it is
determined to be an unacceptable compromise of the stealth characteristics that are so
important to the ship based approach. Additionally, centerline deployment, by itself,
would presumably stop receiving serious consideration if the effective detection range is
found to be too low to provide the minimum acceptable detection coverage for all vessels
of interest. That said, Table 5-12 clearly illustrates the efficiency gains realized through
centerline deployment. Table 5-13 shows the average random to centerline, R/C, values
for the three analyzed fractional coverage volume targets.
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Table 5-13: Average R/C values
Fractional Coverage Volume
0.75 0.85 0.95
R/C 2.249 2.531 3.306
As Table 5-13 illustrates, the efficiency advantage enjoyed by centerline deploy
increases as the desired level of coverage increases. This stems from the diminishing
marginal returns phenomenon associated with random deployment. Unlike the random
case, when additional detectors are deployed along the centerline to achieve a higher
level of fractional detection coverage they will preferentially "fill in" uncovered or
sparsely covered areas of the container array. Therefore, marginal returns are greater
when employing the centerline approach and as a greater number of detectors are added
to provide higher levels of coverage this amplifies the efficiency advantages over random
deployment.
5.7 Total Detector Estimates
To estimate the total number of detectors required to field a comprehensive
system (i.e. to cover every inbound commercial containership) the data compiled in the
previous sections must be combined with information from the shipping industry and
U.S. ports. If all classes of containerships called on U.S. ports with uniform frequency
then the capacity distribution derived in Chapter 4 could be used directly to determine the
total number of detectors. Some types of container vessels, however, make more port
calls than others, so these vessels should receive a higher importance weighting in the
analysis. Table 5-14 shows the relative frequency of calls at U.S. ports broken down by
vessel size (i.e. container capacity) [MARAD, 2000] and the number of calls that these
vessel classes would make out of the CY 2003 call total of 17287 [MARAD(1), 2004].
Table 5-14: U.S. port calls by vessel capacity
Vessel Capacity (TEU)
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<2000 2001-3000 3001-4000 4001-5000 >5000 Total
Relative Freq. 0.3491 0.2853 0.2129 0.1147 0.038 1
Calls 6035 4932 3680 1983 657 17287
Since one of the reference arrays described in the previous analysis fits
approximately in the middle of each of the capacity bins shown in Table 5-14, the
number of detectors found to be required to cover a given reference array can be
considered roughly representative of the entire binned vessel class. Estimates for the




where Avgc/v is the average number of calls made per vessel, Ci is the number of calls for
a given vessel class, and Deti is the number of detectors required for a given vessel class.
In 2003, the average number of calls made by containerships was 17 [MARAD(1), 2004].
Since the detection units have no inland destination and are intended solely for
deployment aboard containerships, once they are discharged from a given vessel they can
be redeployed with minimal downtime. Downtime that could be required for
maintenance and calibration is not considered. For the purposes of this analysis, it is
assumed that turn-around can occur immediately, so the discharged detection unit can be
shipped out (i.e. transported back to a foreign port where it can be deployed for its
intended purpose) without delay. It should be noted that the export leg of the detection
unit's voyage could be used to perform performance reliability tests and to monitor for
the unlikely event that a fissile or radiological source was being smuggled out of the
United States, for use abroad. Stops between foreign ports on the export leg could also
be used to monitor for radioactive material movement abroad, which could discourage or
thwart international smuggling attempts and augment the ability of other nations to
defend against nuclear or radiological attack.
Eq. (13) was applied to the results from the random and centerline deployment
simulations and estimates for the total number of detectors that would be necessary using
either deployment strategy are shown in Table 5-15.
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Table 5-15: Total detector estimates
Total Detector
Estimoatea Deployment StrategyI Fatimtnt I I
I Rnna fft nvarnna DAnrm












0.95 27079 _ _ __ _
0.75 9861 4607
65 0.85 13378 5349
0.95 22612 
0.75 8395 3828
70 0.85 11657 4962
0.95 18957 5837
0.75 7578 3790
75 0.85 9784 4235
0.95 16012 5117
0.75 6406 3106
80 0.85 8789 3906
0.95 14507 4724
0.75 5706 2890
85 0.85 7907 3751
0.95 12751 3906
I
Table 5-15 shows that if only purely random or purely centerline deployment strategies
are being considered, the option space is limited if the effective detection range of the
containerized units is less than 70 ft. An additional advantage to units with effective
ranges equal to or greater than 70 ft is the significant reduction in the number of detectors
required to provide any of the evaluated fractional coverage volumes. Table 5-15 also
demonstrates the reduction in detection units required for full deployment if the fractional
coverage volume is chosen to be less than 95%.
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II 7 -- --- 
Chapter 6: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommended Future Work
6.1 Summary
The rise of highly mobile, religiously motivated transnational terrorist
organizations that are not restrained by conventional means of deterrence has changed the
dynamics of the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the United States. The international
commercial container trade that delivers over 19,000 cargo containers to U.S. ports every
day is one possible avenue that could be exploited by a terrorist organization to mount an
unconventional nuclear attack. Due to the unique power and range of nuclear weapons,
defensive measures that have been envisioned or deployed that would not detect threats
until they come ashore at U.S. ports do not provide adequate protection against attacks
that are planned and executed by rational, determined adversaries.
We propose a new ship-based approach to fissile material detection where large
effective area, commercial off the shelf, radiation detectors, enhanced with imaging
capabilities, are enclosed in standard, non-descript cargo containers and shipped
alongside commercial containers. When deployed in limited numbers aboard commercial
vessels the detection units would passively measure any nuclear signature emitted by
nearby containers with count times limited only by the duration of the voyage. By
outfitting the dedicated detection units with communication hardware, identification and
notification of a potential threat could be made while the danger was still safely removed
from U.S. shores.
To better characterize the feasibility of the proposed ship-based approach,
"external" uncertainties associated with the deployment environment and potential modes
of deployment were investigated. Characteristics of the deployment environment that
were evaluated included the count times that would be available on container import
voyages terminating at U.S. ports, the container capacities of the vessel fleet that ply the
international container trade, and the average densities of cargo being imported to the
U.S. Table 6-1 summarizes the salient results of these analyses.
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Table 6-1: Results summary for deployment environment analyses
Vessel Capacity Avg. Density* Count Time (days)
(TEU) (q/cmA3) To NY To LA
Mean 3047 0.1977 19.2 13.3
Median 2722 0.1708 19.1 13.3
25th 1666 0.1664 21.7 15.1
75th 4173 0.2208 17.2 11.9
95th 6204 0.2620 15.9 11
99th 6782 0.2998 15.6 10.8
* 0.1977 g/cm3 corresponds to 15.23 metric tons / 40'container
To study different potential modes of deployment, a Matlab-based simulator was
developed. The simulator was used to evaluate and compare detection coverage
efficiencies for fully random detector deployment, partially constrained deployment
where containerized detection units could not be placed along the surface of container
array, and fully constrained deployment where detectors could only be placed along the
centerline of the array. Partially constrained deployment was not found to have any
particularly desirable attributes. The number of detection units required to provide
various degrees of coverage for random and centerline deployment are summarized in
Tables 6-2 and 6-3 respectively. Coverage is defined as the fractional volume of a
vessel's container array that is within the effective detection range of one of the deployed
containerized detection units. The effective detection range is the expected maximum
distance at which a source can be confidently and reliably detected in a given count time,
under realistic conditions.
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Table 6-3: Centerline deployment results summaryI __ntene eployment I Reference Array Capacity (TEU)
ICenterl-ne Deployment . . I . .I1440 2496 3600 4800 6460
0.75 5 10 N/A N/A N/A
45 0.85 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.95 10 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.75 5 6 8 N/A N/A
50 0.85 5 9 13 N/A N/A
0.95 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.75 4 6 7 12 N/A
55 0.85 5 6 8 N/A N/A
0.95 5 10 N/A N/A N/A
0.75 4 5 5 7 12
60 0.85 4 6 6 12 N/A
0.95 5 7 9 N/A N/A
0.75 3 5 5 6 8
65 0.85 4 5 5 7 15 5349
0.95 4 6 7 14 N/A
0.75 3 4 4 4 7 3828
70 0.85 4 5 5 6 8 4962
0.95 4 5 6 8 19 6837
0.75 3 4 4 4 6 3790
75 0.85 3 5 4 5 7 4235
0.95 4 5 5 7 9 5117
0.75 2 3 4 4 5 3106
80 0.85 3 4 4 5 6 3906
0.95 3 5 5 7 8 4724
0.75 2 3 3 4 5 2890
85 0.85 3 4 4 4 5 3751































Tables 6-2 and 6-3 show that the geometrically optimal centerline deployment provides
significantly more efficient detection coverage than the stealthier and more logistically
appealing random deployment. The efficiency advantage of centerline deployment is
evidenced by the finding that an average of 2.249, 2.53 1, and 3.306 times more randomly
deployed detection units are required to provide 75%, 85%, and 95% fractional
coverages, respectively, for vessels with a given container array. The preceding tables
also demonstrate the considerable benefit to developing detection units with an effective
detection range equal to, or greater than, 70 ft. Units with ranges at or exceeding 70 ft.
will yield maximum flexibility in terms of deployment options and will significantly
reduce the number of units required to cover a given vessel and to field a comprehensive
ship-based detector network.
6.2 Conclusions
Since this work was performed as one element of an integrated effort, not all of
the calculations and evaluations documented in this thesis may carry significant relevance
and meaning when viewed alone. These results will be combined with, and serve as
input to, ongoing work being conducted by Gallagher at MIT on system design and
performance modeling. The end product of this continuing effort will yield crucial
information regarding the expected performance of the detection units and the overall
efficacy of the ship-based approach. Despite the essentially unfinished nature of system
development, there are a number of notable conclusions that can be drawn strictly from
the analysis presented and discussed in this document.
First, and perhaps most importantly, none of the results obtained in the preceding
analyses serve to discredit the overall feasibility of the ship-based approach. A
primary objective of this thesis was to assess the practical viability of this new
detection methodology and nothing was discovered that suggested the ship-based
approach could not be viable and effective if prudent design and deployment
decisions are made.
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Mean count time estimates for the representative East Coast and West Coast ports
were particularly encouraging. With an average of 19.2 days and 13.3 days of
available count time for voyages to New York and Los Angeles respectively, the
ship-based detection units will have a lengthy window of opportunity to passively
detect incoming fissile material and communicate warning to responders while the
threat is still safely at sea.
The results of deployment simulation highlighted the effective detection range of
containerized units as being especially important to promoting and ensuring the
viability of the ship-based approach. Special consideration should be paid to
maximizing this parameter during upcoming design and optimization activities.
Design decisions that increase the expected detection range at the expense of unit
costs should be vigorously examined in light of the dramatic reductions in per
vessel and total detectors required as effective range was increased. The observed
relationship between the required number of detectors and the effective range
suggests that while unit costs may increase as range enhancing features are
incorporated, the total system costs could fall as less detectors are required on the
whole.
Simulation also helped to quantify the efficiency costs associated with random
deployment. While a purely random deployment strategy is very desirable from
both stealth and logistical standpoints, the use of this approach necessitates the
deployment of 2.2 to 3.3 times more detectors (depending on the fractional
coverage target) than the less covert strategy of deploying detection units only
along the ship's centerline. This inefficiency could become quite costly.
Therefore, some combination of random and centerline deployment may prove to
be the most attractive strategy. In such a "hybrid" deployment scenario, if even a
small number of detectors could be deployed along or near the array's centerline
with the remaining detectors randomly distributed, an important degree of stealth
would be preserved by the random component and a helpful boost in efficiency
will be afforded by the centerline component.
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6.3 Recommendations for Future Work
The deployment strategies described and modeled in this thesis were selected to
represent archetypal cases useful in studying the fundamental trade-off between
deployment stealth and coverage efficiency. Random deployment is at one end of the
spectrum, being the stealthiest approach, but having less than optimal efficiency.
Centerline deployment (i.e. fully constrained placement of detectors along the ship's
centerline) resides at the opposite end of the spectrum, affording optimal efficiency, but
being among the least covert of any potential strategies. Simulations documented in
Chapter 5 provide some quantitative insights into the trade-offs involved when going
from one end of the deployment spectrum to the other. This analysis, however, was
somewhat divorced from important practical considerations that arise from the common
practices and capabilities of the international shipping trade. For instance, it is unclear
whether centerline deployment would be logistically feasible in practice. Therefore, a
clear priority for any future deployment analysis should be to conduct more in-depth
consultations with individuals possessing intimate knowledge of the shipping trade
(particularly the loading and discharging of containerships) to better understand what
types of placement constraints are and are not practicable. This practical knowledge is
essential to understanding the true performance capabilities of a ship-based system and to
developing an effective deployment strategy that can be reliably implemented in the real
world.
Future deployment modeling conducted either to refine the results of this analysis
or to study alternative deployment strategies could employ an enhanced version of the
Monte Carlo simulation codes used to produce the results presented in this thesis.
Simulation codes used in this analysis (and documented in Appendix B) assumed that
detectors could be placed anywhere within a container being used as a dedicated
detection unit. This assumption saved considerable computation time but also created the
opportunity for unphysical situations (e.g. multiple detectors in a single container) to
arise that underestimated the actual performance of the ensemble of deployed detectors.
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Reality would be more accurately modeled if the locations where detectors could be
randomly placed were limited to the centerpoints of simulated containers. Output
distortions caused by double-assignment situations would be eliminated with this
modification. Additionally, by imposing a minimum separation distance between
detectors (i.e. the distance separating the centers of adjacent containers) better overall
distribution should be observed. Therefore, the enhanced simulation would be expected
to show better and more realistic coverage efficiencies than the results shown above.
Another assumption used in deployment modeling that warrants further attention
is the geometry of the coverage volume provided by deployed detectors. In the preceding
analysis, this volume was represented by a perfect sphere centered at a detector and
having a radius equal to the effective detection range of the unit. A focus of future efforts
should be to investigate factors that morph or distort this idealized sphere. This includes
better characterization of important radiation transport phenomena, such as the effects of
potential radiation streaming through tiny openings, or "pinholes", in commercial cargo
packed in containers. More thorough understanding of these mechanisms can lead to
more realistic and appropriate coverage patterns that can be incorporated in future
performance and deployment models.
Another useful extension of the work presented above would be to model a
number of different hybrid deployment scenarios where some detectors were placed
along the ship's centerline (assuming this mode of deployment is found to be practicable)
and the balance were randomly distributed. By performing parameter studies, an optimal
ratio or mix of centerline to random detectors may be identified. The results from this
optimized hybrid deployment could then be compared to the results of pure random and
pure centerline deployment.
Some of the results presented and discussed in this thesis have direct and
important implications for the on going design and performance assessment activities
being conducted by Gallagher at MIT. One outcome with direct bearing on the
continuing design process is the pronounced benefit of detectors that can achieve
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effective detection ranges equal to, or greater than, 70 feet. Results of the parameter
study undertaken as part of the deployment simulation demonstrated that significant gains
in coverage efficiency and deployment flexibility were realized when detection units had
effective ranges of 70 ft or higher. These findings strongly suggest that any available
means to augment the detection range of the containerized detection suite should be
investigated and seriously considered. Even design features that enhance range while
increasing unit costs should be considered since the eventual reduction in the number of
longer-range detectors required to provide a given degree of coverage may ultimately
offset the unit cost increases.
Finally, while computer simulations are very instructive in guiding the design
process and estimating the performance of the proposed ship-based containerized
detection units, there is a limit to what can be confidently demonstrated on the strength of
computer modeling alone. Therefore, at the earliest practical juncture, a full-scale
prototype of a containerized unit, complete with a full detection suite, should be built and
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26.3 P&O Nedlloyd Abidjan
21.0 P&O Nedlloyd Acapulco
21.0 P&O Nedlloyd Accra
26.3 P&O Nedlloyd Aconcagua
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Adelaide
21.0 P&O Nedlloyd Adriana
24.2 P&O Nedlloyd Agulhas
21.0 P&O Nedlloyd Algoa
22.0 P&O Nedlloyd Altiplano
26.3 P&O Nedlloyd Andes
26.4 P&O Nedlloyd Antisana
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Apapa
26.3 P&O Nedlloyd Araucania
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Atacama
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Bantam
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Barentsz
22.0 P&O Nedlloyd Barossa Valley
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Beirut
26.0 P&O Nedlloyd Botany
26.3 P&O Nedlloyd Brisbane
26.4 P&O Nedlloyd Brunel
24.3 P&O Nedlloyd Buenos Aires
24.3 P&O Nedlloyd Cagliari
24.3 P&O Nedlloyd Calypso
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Caracas
24.3 P&O Nedlloyd Caribbean
24.3 P&O Nedlloyd Cesme
26.4 P&O Nedlloyd Chania
24.1 P&O Nedlloyd Christine
22.0 P&O Nedlloyd Chusan
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Cobra
22.0 P&O Nedlloyd Cook
25.9 P&O Nedlloyd Curacao
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Damietta
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Dejima
21.0 P&O Nedlloyd Drake
26.3 P&O Nedlloyd Dubai
26.4 P&O Nedlloyd Encounter
24.0 P&O Nedlloyd Houston
10.0 P&O Nedlloyd Houtman
20.0 P&O Nedlloyd Hudson
16.0 P&O Nedlloyd Hunter Valley
17.5 P&O Nedlloyd Inca
17.5 P&O Nedlloyd Juliana
17.5 P&O Nedlloyd Kobe
P&O Nedlloyd Kowloon


























































































































































24.5 P&O Nedlloyd Magellan
24.5 P&O Nedlloyd Mahe
24.5 P&O Nedlloyd Mairangi
24.5 P&O Nedlloyd Malindi
P&O Nedlloyd Marita
18.7 P&O nedlloyd Maxima
22.0 P&O Nedlloyd Mercator
21.5 P&O Nedlloyd Muisca
18.5 P&O Nedlloyd Nina
P&O Nedlloyd Obock
21.3 P&O Nedlloyd Olinda
20.0 P&O Nedlloyd Palliser
16.5 P&O Nedlloyd Panama
21.0 P&O Nedlloyd Pantanal
20.0 P&O Nedlloyd Pinta
17.0 P&O Nedlloyd Regina
P&O Nedlloyd Remuera
P&O Nedlloyd Rotterdam
16.9 P&O Nedlloyd Salsa
17.3 P&O Nedlloyd Samba
P&O Nedlloyd San Francisco
24.8 P&O Nedlloyd Seattle
20.0 P&O Nedlloyd Shackleton
154.0 P&O Nedlloyd Singapore
60.0 P&O Nedlloyd Southampton
21.0 P&O Nedlloyd Stuyvesant
21.0 P&O Nedlloyd Surat
18.0 P&O Nedlloyd Susana
19.2 P&O Nedlloyd Taranaki
20.5 P&O Nedlloyd Tasman
20.5 P&O Nedlloyd Tema
P&O Nedlloyd Teslin
16.0 P&O Nedlloyd Thekwini
14.5 P&O Nedlloyd Torres
19.8 P&O Nedlloyd Trinidad
25.0 P&O Nedlloyd Valentina
19.5 P&O Nedlloyd Vera Cruz

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sui Jian Hang JI 129
Sui Jian Hang JI 131
Sui Jian Hang 133
Sui Shun 101
Sui Shun Hang 28






























































18.3 CMA CGM Baudelaire
16.0 CMA CGM Belem
15.5 CMA CGM Bellini
25.0 CMA CGM Berlioz
18.0 CMA CGM Bizet
22.0 CMA CGM Capella
18.0 CMA CGM Caribbean
CMA CGM Chardin
11.0 CMA CGM Chopin
15.0 CMA CGM Claudel
CMA CGM Colombie
CMA CGM Condor
18.0 CMA CGM Constellation
18.0 CMA CGM Debussy
18.5 CMA CGM Eygpt
18.0 CMA CGM Elbe
18.0 CMA CGM Emerald
17.0 CMA CGM Energy
18.0 CMA CGM Falcon
16.0 CMA CGM Force
18.0 CMA CGM Fort St Georges
18.5 CMA CGM Fort St Louis
18.5 CMA CGM Fort St Pierre
CMA CGM St Marie
14.5 CMA CGM Greece
16.5 CMA CGM Hispaniola
23.0 CMA CGM Hudson
14.0 CMA CGM Hugo
15.5 CMA CGM Impala
15.5 CMA CGM Kalamata
19.0 CMA CGM Kingston
19.2 CMA CGM Kiwi
17.5 CMA CGM Komodo
20.0 CMA CGM La Bourdonnais
14.0 CMA CGM Latour
25.0 CMA CGM Lea
CMA CGM Licorne
9.0 CMA CGM Maghreb
9.0 CMA CGM Makassar










10.0 CMA CGM Puccini
9.5 CMA CGM Puget






































































































































































































































































CMA CGM St Laurent































































































































































































Xin Hui JI 12
Xin Hui JI 13
Xin Hui JI 15
Xin Hui JI 16
Xin Hui JI 19




















































































































































































































































Xin Hui JI 22
Xin Hui JI 23
Xin Hui JI 3
Xin Hui JI 5



























































































































































































































































































function cov = cov_3d(X,Y,Z,r,num det,N) % X: Height of container array (in TEUs)
% Y: Width of container array (in TEUs)
% Z: Length of container array (in TEUs)
% r: Effective detection range (in feet)
% num_det: Number of detectors to be deployed
% N: Number of runs
tic
x = 8 * X; % Conversion from TEUs
y = 8 * Y; % Conversion from TEUs


















% Constructs initial geometry matrix
% Generates random number vector
% Number of detectors loop
% Constructs a new detector matrix
% Fixes the x-coordinate of the detector
% Fixes the y-coordinate of the detector
% Fixes the z-coordinate of the detector
% Establishes the detector's center-point
% in the detector matrix
for i = dx-r:dx+r % x-axis loop




for j = dy-r:dy+r % y-axis loop
if ((j < 1) I (j > y)) % Dimension control
continue
end
for k = dz-r:dz+r % z-axis loop
if ((k < 1) I (k > z)) % Dimension control
continue
end
if sqrt((i-dx)^2+(j-dy)^2+(k-dz)^2) <= r % Checks whether









DO = DO D1; % Current geometry matrix and detector matrix are 'OR'ed together
count = count + 1;
end.




mean cov = mean(cov)
mediancov = median(cov)
stdcov = std(cov)
min cov = min(cov)
max cov = max(cov)
% Sums the number of elements within detection spheres
% Calculates fractional coverage volume and writes it
% to an output vector
% Statistical analysis of full output vector




% Constrained Deployment Simulator
function cov = new_3d(X,Y,Z,r,num_det,N) % X: Height of container array (in TEUs)
% Y: Width of container array (in TEUs)
% Z: Length of container array (in TEUs)
% r: Effective detection range (in feet)
% num_det: Number of detectors to be deployed
% N: Number of runs
tic
x = 8 * X; % Conversion from TEUs to feet
y = 8 * Y; % Conversion from TEUs to feet
z = 20 * Z; % Conversion from TEUs to feet
for 1 =- :N
DO = logical(zeros(x,y,z)); % Constructs initial geometry matrix
count = 1;
pos = rand(1,20); % Generates random number vector
while count < (numdet + 1) % Number of detectors loop
D1 = logical(zeros(x,y,z)); % Constructs a new detector matrix
pos = rand(l,20);
rnd cnt = 1;
x switch = 0; %
y_switch = 0; % Initializes constraint test variables
z switch = 0; %
while x switch < 1 %
dx_test = ceil(pos(rnd_cnt)*x); %
if ((dx_test > 8) & (dx_test < (x-7))) % Checks if x-coordinate
dx = dx test; % satisfies constraints
rndcnt = rndcnt +1; %
x switch = 1; %
else
rnd cnt = rnd cnt + 1;
end
end
while y_switch < 1 %
dy_test = ceil(pos(rnd_cnt)*y); %
if ((dy_test > 8) & (dy test < (y-7))) % Checks if y-coordinate
dy = dy_test; % satisfies constraints
rnd cnt = rnd cnt + 1; %
y_switch = 1; %
else




while z switch < 1
dz_test = ceil(pos(rnd_cnt)*z);
if ((dztest > 20) & (dz test < (z-19)))
dz = dz test;
rnd cnt = rnd cnt + 1;
z switch = 1;
else




% Checks if z-coordinate
% satisfies constraints
% Establishs detector center-point
% in the detector matrix
for i = dx-r:dx+r
if ((i < 1) I (i > ))
continue
end
for j = dy-r:dy+r
if ((j < 1) ( > ))
continue
end
for k = dz-r:dz+r









if sqrt((i-dx)^2+(j-dy)^2+(k-dz) 2) <= r
Dl(i,j,k) = 1;
% Checks whether
% element is within
% the detection
% sphere





DO = DO D1; % Current geometry matrix and detector matrix are 'OR'ed together
count = count + 1;






% Sums the number of elements within detection spheres
% Calculates fractional coverage volume and writes it
% to an output vector
File = strcat(num2str(X), '',num2str(Y) , ',num2str(Z),' ',num2str(r),' ',num2str(numdet 
), ' ' ,num2str(N))
meancov = mean(cov)
median cov = median(cov)
stdcov = std(cov)
min cov = min(cov)
max cov = max(cov)
% Statistical analysis of full output vector
toc
179
% Centerline Deployment Simulator
function cov = centerline(X,Y,Z,r,det_start,det_step,det_stop)
tic
x = 8 * X; % Conversion from TEUs to feet
y = 8 * Y; % Conversion from TEUs to feet
z = 20 * Z; % Conversion from TEUs to feet
DO = logical(zeros(x,y,z)); % Constructs initial geometry matrix
for det = det_start : det_step : det_stop % Detector placement loop
D1 = logical (zeros(x,y,z)); % Constructs a new detector matrix
dx = ?; % 1440 TEU -> dx = 28
% 2496 TEU -> dx = 36
% 3600 TEU -> dx = 36
% 4800 TEU -> dx = 36
% 6460 TEU -> dx = 36
dy = ?; % 1440 TEU -> dy = 36
% 2496 TEU -> dy = 44
% 3600 TEU -> dy = 44
% 4800 TEU -> dy = 60
% 6460 TEU -> dy = 68
dz = det % Places detectors along the length
Dl(dx,dy,dz) = 1; % Fixes center-point of detector in
% the detector matrix
for i = dx-r:dx+r % x-axis loop
if ((i < 1) I (i > x)) % Dimension control
continue
end
for j = dy-r:dy+r % y-axis loop
if ((j < 1) (j > y)) % Dimension cont:
continue
end
for k = dz-r:dz+r % z-axis
if ((k < 1) I (k > z)) % Dimension cont:
continue
end













DO = DO Dl;
detco = sum(sum(sum(DO)));
co = det_cov/(x*y*z);
% Current geometry matrix and detector matrix are 'OR'ed together
% Sums the number of elements within detection spheres
% Calculates fractional coverage volume
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